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When the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed at the end of
the last decade, the opposition, which had been united in their goal to defeat Communism,
quickly disintegrated into a variety of factions.
1
Prior to the "Velvet Revolution", a broad
consensus among dissidents "did not require the elaboration of a more concrete conception
of democracy and its institutions, [and] those opposed to the Communists never developed
a unified vision of the institutional arrangements which must now replace the old
dictatorship."
2
The new political leaders were confronted with several issues that proved to be much
more controversial than they had previously imagined. One of their tasks was to decide on
the future institutional structure of their government and on which powers should be
attributed to the different institutions. Another important issue was whether a state should
enact a constitution, in order to stabilize and entrench the new democratic institutions.
3 Apart
from establishing the legal framework for a democracy, politicians had to develop strategies
to convert the state-run economy into a free-market economy. Such a transition required as
a first step the privatization of state property.
4
'Seven Central and Eastern European countries commutated from Communism to democracy: Albania,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (since 1993 divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Yugoslavia.
2
Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee ofthe
Polish Parliament, 58 U.Chi.L.Rev. 595, 631 (1991).
3
Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 448 (1991).
Vojtech Cepl, The Road Out ofSerfdom, 12 VERA LEX 3 (1992).
2
Essential to the concept of central planning is the concentration of all means of
production in the hands of the state. According to "The Communist Manifesto", "the theory
of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private
property."
5 Communism achieves this by nationalizing all private property:
It is only because the control of the means of production is divided
among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power
over us ... If all the means of production were vested in a single hand,
whether it be nominally that of 'society' as a whole or that of a dictator,
whoever exercises this control has complete power over us. 6
Consequently, the reverse change from central planning to a market economy in Central and
Eastern Europe required the re-distribution of state property among the people, i.e.
privatization.
At the same time, a legal system protecting private property rights had to be created,
not only to encourage entrepreneurship among nationals, but also to attract foreign
investment.
7
"Without the definite establishment of protected property rights, foreign
investors [would] be hesitant to invest any money,"
8
for fear of losing it to the nationalizing
state. Unlike Western legal systems which only recognize one form of property, communist
systems distinguish between different classifications of property rights, such as "socialist
property" or "people's property", "personal property" and "private property".
9 Communist
doctrine considers natural resources and means of industrial production to be socialist
property which is superior to other forms of property,
10
because it is "more egalitarian".11
Socialist property has certain advantages over property of other classifications. For instance,
5Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto 27 (Paul M. Sweezy trans., 1964).
6
Cepl, supra note 4, at 2 (citing Friedrich August von Hayek).
7




Jeffrey J. Renzulli, Claims of U.S. Nationals under the Restitutional Laws ofCzechoslovakia, 15 B. C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 170 (1992); Cheryl W. Gray et al., The Legal Framework ofPrivate Sector
Development in a Transitional Economy: The Case ofPoland, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283, 287 (1992);
Rainer Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809,
829(1994).
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Renzulli, supra note 9, at 1 70.
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'Cepl, supra note 4, at 3.
3
it cannot be transferred and is immune to bankruptcy. 12 In order to establish a free-market
economy, this "hierarchy of ownership" 13 had to be eliminated and private property as the
only form of property had to be guaranteed.
Unless every item of property has a precisely defined owner who is
responsible for it, a market cannot perform its functions, such as matching
the actual risks of engaging in business with rewards, and thus providing the
incentive for people to develop innovative products and to operate
efficiently.
14
Legal reform of property rights raises the question: how should claims of former
owners whose property was expropriated by the Communist state be settled? Should the post-
Communist government restore such property in kind? Should it compensate former owners
financially? Or would it be immoral to restore property to former owners or their heirs who
are mostly emigrants, rather than giving it to the current citizens of ex-Communist countries
who are almost all poor? 15
Germany, the Czech Republic, and Poland have all considered the option of
restitution. In deciding "who should be eligible to recover and how much should be
returned",
16
they have developed or, in the case of Poland, are in the process of developing,
complex restitution regimes. It is the objective of this thesis to analyze the different regimes
under aspects of international law and under the constitutional law of the respective
countries.
While Chapter II gives an overview of the various expropriation measures taken in
each country and their historical context. Chapter III examines the structure and content of
the individual restitution laws and, with regard to Poland, of the different draft laws. Chapter
IV criticizes certain aspects of each restitution regime under international law. The
evaluation under local constitutional law is confined to the information accessible to the
12
Frank, supra note 9, at 829.
13
Gray, supra note 9, at 287.
14
Cepl, supra note 4, at 3.
15




author, which was limited particularly with regard to the Czech Republic and Poland.
Following an analysis of the political background shaping restitution programs in Eastern
Europe, Chapter V takes account of the economic impact that implementation of these
programs has had so far. The conclusion reached in this thesis is that, despite their inherent
legal deficiencies, restitution regimes are bound to withstand revision efforts in the face of




In Germany, the history of expropriations which are relevant in terms of the post-
Communist restitution regime dates back further than in other (East) European countries.
After its rise to power on Jan. 30, 1933, the National Socialist government on Feb. 28, 1933
enacted the "Decree for the Protection of the People and the State". This decree enabled
government authorities to place restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of speech, and inter
alia on the right to own property, in order to avert "Communist acts of violence against the
State."
17
Moreover, persons who disobeyed government orders under the decree could be
penalized through confiscation of property.
18
In accordance with the antisemitic Nazi ideology, similar restrictions were placed on
German citizens of Jewish origin. Beginning with a national boycott of Jewish shops and
merchandise, Jewish lawyers and doctors,
19
and continuing with the "Nuremberg Statutes"20
which denied Jews German citizenship and prohibited every-day intercourse between Jews
and German citizens, Jews were deprived of the means to existence. Persons who were
considered to be "Jews" under Nazi law, were thus forced to sell their property, businesses
17
Verordnung des Reichsprasidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat [Presidential Decree for the Protection
of the People and the State], v. 28.2.1933 (RGB1. I S.83).
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as well as land,
21
and, in many cases, chose to emigrate from Germany.22 The government
authorities often made the sales a condition for emigration. The proceeds of such forced sales
were confiscated "under one pretext or another."23
Groups of persons persecuted by the Nazis other than communists and Jews, include
socialists, gypsies, and "outspoken critics" of the Third Reich. 24 Many of these people also
had their property taken from them. All victims of Nazi oppression have raised claims to
restitution or compensation for their lost property since the end of World War II.
After the war, the Allied Powers divided Germany into four zones of occupation.
Each power was responsible for the administration of one zone. While the western Allies
conducted an economically motivated land reform which redistributed about 700,000
hectares (ha) to mostly refugees from the eastern parts of Germany, but provided for financial
compensation of former owners, 25 the proceedings undertaken by the Soviet occupation
authorities were of a different nature. The SMAG (Soviet Military Administration for
Germany), in September of 1945, conducted a sweeping land reform during which all real
estate holdings exceeding 100 ha (about 250 acres) were confiscated and transferred to a real
estate pool (Bodenfonds). Subsequently, plots of land no greater than 7,5 ha were allocated
from the pool to landless farmers, refugees and general laborers.
26 Moreover, property
holdings belonging to war criminals or affiliates of the Nazi party were confiscated.
27
These
expropriations were executed "with no pretense ofcompensation".
28 They encompassed land.
21
Jessica Heslop & Joel Roberto, Property Rights in the Unified Germany: A Constitutional, Comparative,
and International Legal Analysis, 1 1 B.U. Int'l L.J. 243, 258 n.94 (1993).
22
2 H.UBER& MOLLER, at 508. Of the 499 000 Jews residing in Germany in 1933, 125 000 emigrated until
July, 1939.
23




Paul-Werner von der Schulenburg, The"Democratic Land Reform in the Soviet Occupational Zone 1945
to 1949", address at the Rothary Club in Dusseldorf, Germany 4 (Jan. 30, 1992) (on file with author).
26
'Id. ; Frank, supra note 9, at 8 1 3
.
27




buildings, inventory, and business supplies and constituted approximately one third of the
agricultural land in the Soviet zone.
29
The land reform conducted by the SMAG served a dual purpose. On the one hand,
it represented a considerable step towards the realization of socialist ideology, in that the
"abolition of private ownership of land is one of the most important measures of the socialist
revolution."
30 On the other hand, its goal was to punish the persons allegedly responsible for
the war, i.e. "the aristocratic Junkers, the Nazis, fascists, and war criminals."31 However, this
stage of the reform was only intermediate. Since the allocated land plots were too small for
individual farming enterprises, it is obvious that, in the long run, the reforms were aimed at
the collectivization of agriculture.
32
In addition to the land reform, the SMAG replaced the banking, insurance and energy
industries with state-run monopolies.
3j
With the foundation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949, Soviet
control in East Germany came to a formal end, but expropriations continued under East
German authority. 34 By putting economic pressure on private businesses, the East German
government forced them into bankruptcy and exploited them, e.g. through "the revocation
of business licenses, the denial of access to resources necessary for production, and the
cancellation of orders."
35 Some owners were forced to deed property to the state "to relieve
outstanding debts owed to the government."36
In 1952, a government directive nationalized the property which had been re-
allocated under the 1945 land reform by establishing agricultural cooperatives. Most farmers
were forced to join these, albeit they were large and inefficient. This played an essential role
von der Schulenburg, supra note 25, at 4.
30
Id, at 5 (citing a Leninist strategy from 1920).
3V at 4.
32







in the deterioration of the economic situation in East Germany . 37 By 1960 the
collectivization of all private farms was completed. 38 Although the land owners emerging
from the 1945 reform still held titular ownership, their property was subject to usufructuary
rights on behalf of the collectives which de facto rendered their property right non-existent. 39
Property abandoned by refugees was initially placed under trusteeship, but since 1 958
was simply expropriated without compensation.40 In the case of agricultural real estate, the
same practice was eventually adopted and the land was placed under administration by the
agricultural cooperatives. Individuals who had left the G.D.R. legally formally retained
private ownership but were deprived of their disposition rights by the government which de
facto became expropriation as well. 41
Upon reunification of Germany on Oct.3, 1990, most expropriated owners, the
victims of the 1945 land reform as well as those who suffered from confiscations conducted
by the East German government during the course of the GDR, demanded restitution of their
property.
B. Czech Republic
After the First World War. the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy resulted in
the proclamation of the independence of Czechoslovakia on Oct. 28, 1918. Czechs and
Slovaks lived in one state until Jan. 1, 1993, when political tensions between representations
of the more economically developed Czech lands and the poorer Slovakia, where Vladimir
Meciar had gained mass support for Slovak emancipatory endeavors, caused the
37
Dorothy A. Jeffress, Resolving Claims on East German Property Upon German Reunification, 101 YALE
L.J. 527, 531 (1991).
38
Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law ofGerman Reunification, 50 Md. L. Rev. 475, 545 (1991).
39





Czechoslovak Federal Republic to break apart. 42 Two separate states emerged: the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic.
The modern history of expropriations in Czechoslovakia begins with the Munich
Agreement signed on Sept. 29, 1938 whereby Czechoslovakia ceded the Sudetenland to
Germany. Before the cession, the Sudeten Germans which constituted 22% of the population
of the Czechoslovakian Republic were the strongest minority in the country.
43 The enormous
pressure that their leader Konrad Henlein, supported by Hitler, put on the Czechoslovakian
government, and the rise of Nazism among the Sudeten Germans under the auspices of
Henlein' s "Sudeten German Party", finally compelled the Czechoslovak President Benes to
abide by the Munich Agreement and give up the contested territory.
44 The Agreement also
provided for the cession of the southern parts ofMoravia and Slovakia to Hungary.
45 German
aggression did not subside, however. In March 1939, Hitler, who sought to "strengthen
Germany's eastern flank,"46 invaded Czechoslovakia and established the German
Protectorates of Bohemia and Morav'a. All Sudeten German inhabitants of the Protectorate
were granted full citizenship in the Reich, whereas Czechs were only granted citizenship of
the Protectorate.
47 A decree passed by the Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich, who was
installed by Hitler as governor of the Protectorate, placed all Czech Jews under German
jurisdiction and sanctioned the confiscation of Jewish property, in conformity with Nazi
law.
48
After the end of the war in May 1945, Czechoslovakia was reconstituted within its
1918 borders, and the Benes government returned. Among the government's first acts was
42
Petr Cornej, Fundamentals of Czech History 39-40, 46-47 (1992).
43
1 HUBER & MUELLER, supra note 22, at 364.
44
Id., at 384; Charles Schiller, Closing a Chapter ofHistory: Germany's Right to Compensationfor the
Sudetenland, 26 Case W. Res. J. INT'LL. 401, 410-1 1 (1994).
45






Robert Hochstein, Jewish Property Restitution in the Czech Republic, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
423,427(1996).
10
the Decree of June 21, 1945 which provided for confiscation of all farmland belonging to
persons of German or Hungarian nationality. 49 Exempt were only those who had actively
participated in the resistance against Nazism. The decree also "applied to all societies and
corporations whose management willingly and deliberately served the German war machine
or Nazism, and Fascism in general."50
On August 2, 1945 all inhabitants of the Czechoslovak Republic of German or
Hungarian descent were officially denationalized. Since the Sudeten Germans had been
granted German citizenship under German occupation, they were not rendered stateless, but
lost their dual citizenship and became German citizens. 51 Germans or Hungarians who did
not retain their property on the basis that they had participated in Nazi resistance were forced
to leave Czechoslovakia.
5^.5 million Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovak
territory.
53 On their trek west, 250,000 ofthem were killed or died of starvation and illness. 54
On October 25, 1945, the Czechoslovak government issued another decree which ordered
the confiscation of "all movable and immovable property belonging to persons and
institutions hostile to the Czechoslovak Republic."
55
The Sudeten German exiles and their offspring make up about 15% of Germany's
current electorate.
56
Their political leader Franz Neubauer
57
has reinforced their request to
be allowed to return to their Heimat.
58
In particular, Neubauer demands the repeal of the
4
Schiller, supra note 44. at 421& n.133. National Committees, mainly made up of Czech and Slovak
patriots who led the resistance against the Nazis, decided who was German or Hungarian. Their decision







Arthur Allen, Postwar Expulsions test Czech-German Relations, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at
6.
5A
German-Czech accord ends hopefor Sudeten property claims: Havel, Agence France-Presse, Jan. 22,
1997. According to German accounts, the number of those killed amounts to 250,000; Czech sources speak
of about 25,000.
55
Schiller, supra note 44, at 424.
56
Allen, supra note 53.
57
Neubauer is the leader of the "Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft", which represents Sudeten German
interests on a political level.
CO
German for "homeland" with a notion of nostalgia
11
Benes decrees on the denationalization and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and seizure
of their property, and the "mutual" compensation of Czech Nazi victims and the Sudeten
Germans.
59 He suggested the Czech government should grant the Sudeten Germans land in
exchange for confiscated property which Sudeten German businessmen could then use to
"attract beneficial investment".
60
The Benes government's decrees of 1945, including the nationalization of certain
industrial enterprises, banks, and insurance companies on October 24, 1945, transferred
almost 60% of Czechoslovak industry from private individuals to the state. 61 In 1947, in
implementation of an agrarian land reform program, another decree was enacted which
reduced the limit of individual holdings in agricultural or forest land from 250 ha to 50 ha. 62
Those whose property was subject to confiscation were either not at all compensated or were
promised adequate compensation which was never paid. 63
On February 25, 1948, the Communist insurgents seized power in Czechoslovakia.
They enacted a new constitution and a new civil code which created three classifications of
property — socialist (state) property, personal property, and private property. 64 Although
private property was tolerated in the 1948 Constitution, the Communist government
consistently deprived its citizens of these rights in order to complete socialist objectives. By
the early 1960s, all means of production, including medium and small enterprises and shops,
had been nationalized.
65
The Communist government also confiscated houses and banned the former owners
from the communities in which their houses were located, even though private ownership of
59
Franz Neubauer— Uncompromising Fighterfor Sudeten Germans, CTK National News Wire, Feb. 8,
1996.
6V








houses was legally permissible. 66 Other owners were compelled to give up their property due
to excessive restrictions placed upon house owners by the government.
Finally, the constitutional guarantee with respect to private ownership of agrarian
land holdings smaller than 50 ha was overturned. The government de facto expropriated this






Polish history is marked by a series of drastic territorial changes, beginning in the 1
8
th
century with the three Polish partitions,
68
and continuing well into our century. After World
War I, the so-called corridor of Pomerania which had previously been part of Germany was
restored to Poland. Leaving the territory of East Prussia (east of the Oder and Neisse rivers
and bordering the Baltic Sea) an exclave of the Third Reich, this area constituted a potential
threat to Polish territorial integrity.
69 The situation culminated in Hitler's occupation of
Poland in September of 1939. and his subsequent establishment of a "General Government"
under German control. Thus, since the outbreak of World War II, an agreement existed
"among the member states of the anti-Nazi coalition that Eastern Prussia should not belong
to Germany after the war."70 The Potsdam Agreement which was signed during the Potsdam
meeting of the Three Powers in July/August of 1945, dealt with the problem of East Prussia
accordingly: Chapter VI settled "the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of
Konigsberg i,nd the area adjacent to it."
71
This was complemented by Chapter IX.B, stating
that "the former German territories (Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia) . . . including that
portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics . . . shall be under the administration of the Polish state and for such purposes
should not be considered part of the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany."
72
Despite their de facto validity, the decisions made at Potsdam did not constitute a
definitive, legally binding settlement regarding territorial sovereignty over East Prussia.
68
The first partition took place in 1772, when Poland lost almost one third of its territory to Russia, Prussia,
and Austria. In 1793, Prussia and Russia agreed to a further partitioning of Poland which constituted a
compensation demanded by the Prussians for their efforts at containing revolutionary France. After the
signing of the Final Treaty of Partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1797, Poland ceased to exist as an
independent state. It only reemerged an independent nation after World War I.
69
Tadeusz Jasudowicz, The Polish-Russian Delimitation in Former East Prussia in the Light ofthe





Protocol of the Proceedings of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, Aug. 2, 1945, U.K.-U.S.S.R.-U.S., 3
Bevans 1207 (1945), 2 Foreign Relations of the United States 1478 (1945).
~Id. ; Jasudowicz, supra note 69, at 48.
14
According to the Agreement itself, the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland
was to await a peace settlement. 73 However, no such settlement came about until the
conclusion of the Moscow Treaty74 in 1990. This agreement between the Allied Powers and
the two German states finally prompted Poland and Germany to reach a final decision
regarding their common frontier75 in 1991. 76
The provisions of the Potsdam Agreement dealing with territorial issues were
accompanied by Chapter XIII, titled "Orderly Transfers of German Populations."77 This
section determined the expulsion of all Germans who had neither fled nor been interned in
camps, but had remained in the area east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. 78 A decree of Sept.
13, 1945 ordered their evacuation.
79 They were forced to leave behind unsold all their
movable and immovable property, and were only allowed to take their most essential
personal belongings. The property was subsequently "secured" by Polish authorities. 80
Expropriation was not limited to German property, however. Due to Poland's
geographical position after the territorial changes made at Potsdam, it was the primary
objective of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe to win Poland over to communism. 81 Upon
entering Poland, the Red Army wiped out political centers supported by the Polish
government in exile and set up the Communist-controlled "Committee of National
73
Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Current Development: The new Polish-German Treaties and the Changing
Political Structure ofEurope, 86 AM. J. Int'l L. 163 (1992).
74
Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R.-Fr.-U.S.S.R.-
U.K.-U.S., 14 U.S. T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted in 29 LL.M. 1 186 (1990) [hereinafter Moscow
Treaty].
75
Germany - Poland: Agreement in Relation to Ratification of the Border Between Them, Nov. 14, 1990,
F.R.G.-Pol., 830 U.N.T.S. 327, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1292 (1992).
16
See Czaplinki, supra note 73, at 164 et seq. Poland's legal position was that the delineation in the
Potsdam Agreement was intended as final. Conversely, the German position held that it was not. It argued
that the German Reich survived the military surrender in 1945 and continued to exist as a passive subject of
international law. Not being party to the Potsdam Agreement, it was not bound by it, according to the rule
pacta tertii. Therefore, sovereignty could not be transferred to Poland until an agreement was concluded
with the unified German state, which did not occur until 1991.
See supra, note 69.
78










Liberation," which was recognized by its Soviet sponsor as the provisional Polish
government on Jan. 5, 1945.
82
Recognition by the major Western powers followed in July
ofl945. 83
In accord with communist economical and social strategies, the Committee of
National Liberation initiated a radical land reform even while hostilities were still in
progress.
84
On September 6, 1 944, a decree on the expropriation of land holdings
exceeding 100 hectares (247 acres) of total area or 50 hectares in cases of
purely agricultural land was announced. No compensation was provided, and
in the execution of the land reform properties even below the proscribed
maximums were also seized. Since political considerations were paramount,
the land reform in the old parts of Poland resulted in the proliferation of
uneconomically small land holdings. 85
Through the creation of small farms averaging between five and ten acres in size, the
Communist regime "may have hoped that the peasants would soon see the impossibility of
existing on these small farms and then be ripe for collectivization."86 The Communists were
well aware of the fact that the Polish peasantry, traditionally conservative with a deep love
of the land, was strongly individualistic and, as a result, opposed to collectivization. 87
Therefore, the Communist goal to collectivize Poland was officially denied until 1948.
Although several collectives were formed between 1949 and 1956, their number decreased
from late 1956 on, when the government released figures proving that collective farms were
much less productive than those owned by private entrepreneurs. 88 Government sources as







/d.(stating that the resulting landholdings were uneconomic, since the farmers could not make a complete
living on them, and since they did not provide a surplus of grain or other food stuffs for the non-farm
population).





collectivized, while almost 87% was still in private hands. 89 The remaining 12% were state
farms which could not survive without subsidies.
The 1 944 land reform also applied to German agricultural property which amounted
to 7,14 million ha, and had constituted one fourth of the agricultural land of the Third
Reich.
90 Through division of former German estates, farms were created for Polish settlers
mainly coming from the former Polish territories that had been ceded to the Soviet Union. 91
These settlers were to provide "a human wall against any possible future German
irredentism."
92
According to a law ofMay 5, 1945, property owned by the German state and property
of German citizens or of persons that had deserted to the enemy, was considered to be
abandoned and was subsequently transferred to the Polish authorities per decree. 93 Also, a
decree issued by the ministry of trade on Oct.6, 1945, ordered the distribution of former
German stocks remaining in Poland.
While the goal of the land reform was to liquidate the influential landowning gentry
and to create a powerful class of small peasants who would support the Communists,94 the
measures against the Germans were mainly designed to appeal to Polish nationalism. 95 In
general, Communist political and economic policies were directed towards binding Poland
closer to the Soviet Union and imposing upon it a totalitarian system of government.
96
Nationalization of the Polish industry was the next step on the Communist agenda.




ERMACORA, supra note 78, at 49.
91
BZREZINSKI, supra note 81, at 13 (60% of those landholdings were from 5-20 ha in size).
92
Staar, supra note 86, at 82.
93ERMACORA, supra note 78, at 46-47.
94
Aronovitz & Miroslav Wyrzykowski, The Polish Draft Law on Reprivatisation: some Reflections on




Mark F. Bzrezinski, Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case ofPoland, 77 Va. L. REV. 49, 87
(1991).
17
since 1944. On Jan. 3, 1946, the Polish government enacted the Law "Concerning the
Seizure of Basic Branches of the National Economy" which transferred to state ownership
every enterprise "capable of employing more than 50 workers per shift."97 This included the
power, gas and water works, the petroleum industry, the armament industry, sugar factories
and flour mills, and printing establishments. 98 Although the law provided for compensation,
it was never actually paid to domestic owners affected by it. 99
Following nationalization through the original law, the government sought to gain
control of the domestic trade sector, a sphere of economic activity on which the standard of
living greatly depended.
100 From 1947 on, the government imposed restrictions on private
trade through pricing, taxation, granting of concessions, and other regulatory policies which
put the private entrepreneur at a disadvantage to the state sector.
101
These policies were de
facto expropriations. As a result, the number of private wholesale firms fell from 3,307 to
1,128, while that of private retail shops dropped from 131,218 to 76,728.
102
Entrepreneurs
who violated the often contradictory regulations were subject to prohibitive fines, jail
sentences and compensation of property without compensation.
103
It is remarkable that the
authorities generally declined to replace the bankrupt private firms with state enterprises, but
concentrated on the development of heavy industry instead.
104
Another group suffering from expropriation measures were Polish Jews. Before
World War II, the 3.5 million Jews in Poland constituted one of the largest Jewish








Zbigniew Landau & Jerzy Tomaszewski, The Polish Economy in the Twentieth Century 205-06
(Wojciech Roszkowski trans., St. Martin's Press 1985).m
Id
]02
Id; See also Malgorzata Halaba, Re-Writing History - Pencilfamily charts its own restitution course,
Warsaw Business Journal, June 10, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Malaba, Re-Writing History].
103Ben Slay, The Polish Economy - Crisis, Reform, and Transformation 22 (1994).
10V,at23.
l05
Malgorzata Halaba, Sacred Ground - Jews still waitfor Property Restitution, WARSAW BUSINESS
JOURNAL, July 8, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Malaba, Sacred Ground].
18
community was the owner of vast holdings, a great part of which was destroyed in the war.
Other Jewish communal property was simply seized by occupying German authorities during
the war, and was later nationalized by the Communists. 106 According to data from the Polish
government's department of religions, communal holdings still in the hands of the Polish
state today relate to 415 cemeteries, 228 synagogues, 70 houses ofprayers, 28 funeral homes,
25 mikvehs, 27 schools, 6 orphanages, 1 house for elderly people, 4 hospitals and 22
community headquarters. 107 Through Nazi decimation of the Jews in Poland, the Jewish
population shrunk tragically.
108
In 1994, only 6,000 Jews lived in Poland.
I09
According to the
World Jewish Congress, these survivors should be the beneficiaries of the communal
inheritance, while everything that the local community could not absorb should be spent
helping 300,000 Holocaust survivors worldwide.
110
Private property of Jews had been confiscated by the Nazis during World War II.
After the war, Polish authorities treated this property, most of whose former owners had not
survived the Holocaust, as German. Buildings were taken by new users and eventually
nationalized.
1 " Political discussion about a draft restitution law, however, revolved mainly
around the restitution of communal property. 112
Finally, the history of expropriations encompasses the property of the Catholic
Church in Poland. Since the Communists believed "that their authority alone should embrace
the totality of human experience," 113 their objective was elimination of the Church and
religion from people's lives.
114
















STAAR, supra note 86, at 241.
1 l4
The Polish Catholic Church has a great stronghold over the population. 95% of Poles are practicing
catholics. In retrospect, government repression of the Church rather increased than lessened its influence,
conferring upon the Church "the halo of matyrdom." See Bzrezinski, supra note 96, at 88.
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nationalizing all land in possession of the Church, except for that used by parish priests for
their own subsistence." 5
Compared to East Germany or Czechoslovakia, the situation in post -Communist
Poland is different in that private ownership of land remained the rule rather than the
exception..
116
Although most urban land, including all of Warsaw, and land occupied by state
enterprises was placed under state ownership, less than 20% of agricultural land, mainly in
the former German territories, was nationalized. 117
Nevertheless, lobbies for restitution are strong. More than fifty associations of former
property owners filed collective claims on a total of 2.4 million acres of land and more than
2,000 factories,
118
comprising six percent of Polish industry. They argue that not reversing
the Communist expropriations would amount to a "continuation of the Communist regime's
behavior."
119
It is worth noting though, that even the most radical advocates of restitution
exempt the 1944 land reform from their proposals. 120
" 5
STAAR, supra note 86, at 242.
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Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics ofReprivatization in East-Central Europe: A Comparison, 14 U.
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Chapter III
Structure and Content of Restitution Regimes
A. Germany
1 . Joint Declaration on Open Property Issues
Prior to unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) and the German
Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) on October 3, 1990, the Governments of the two countries
signed the Joint Declaration of June 15, 1990
121 which was later incorporated into the
Unification Treaty
122
as Article 41 and Annex III of that treaty. The Declaration set forth the
basic principles with respect to privatization and restitution, and provided general
instructions regarding legislative steps to be taken by the G.D.R. in order to implement these
principles.
123
Article 3 of the Declaration set forth the general principle of restitution-in-kind:
Property nationalized by the East German government after the foundation of the G.D.R. on
October 6, 1949 should be returned to its former owners or their heirs. However, two
exceptions were made to this rule. In the case that the property at issue had been dedicated
to public use, used to house East German citizens, or integrated into an industrial enterprise,
1 21
" Gemeinsame Erklarung der Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik zur Regelung offener Vermogensfragen [Joint Declaration of the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the Regulation of Open Property
Questions], June 15, 1990, 1990 BULLETIN 661 (Press and Information Agency of the Federal Government
of the FRG) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik iiber
die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands [Treaty on the Unification of Germany], Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.
-
G.D.R., BGB1. II S.889 (F.R.G.)[hereinafter Unification Treaty].
"''Frank, supra note 9, at 822.
20
21
its return would have been impractical. 124 The former owner therefore had to accept cash
compensation in lieu of restitution. 125 The same is true, when citizens of the G.D.R. had
acquired property rights "in an honest manner."
126
This provision served the purpose to
render invalid acquisitions of valuable property made by high party officials in the last days
of the Modrow government in abuse of their position of power. 127
Article 8 contains a general anti-fraud provision.
128
stating that property rights
acquired through abuse of power, corruption, extortion or fraud would not be recognized.
Applicable to governmental authorities as well as private individuals, it sought to prevent
anyone from benefitting from oppressive acts of the state. 129
By far the most controversial provision of the Joint Declaration is Article 1 which
fixed the irreversibility of expropriations made during the time of Soviet occupation, i.e.
during the period ofMay 8, 1945 until October 6, 1949 . 13° Although the possibility of future
compensation of those concerned was left open to an all-German parliament, "a constant
drumbeat of outraged letters" 131 to newspaper editors and government authorities emerged
as a consequence to the publication of the Declaration. Challengers of Article 1 filed
constitutional complaints in the Bundesverfassunsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court),
Joint Declaration, supra note 121, art. 3(a).
25
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 249.
126
Joint Declaration, supra note 121. art. 3(b). The German term "in redlicher Weise" seems to differ from
the concept of good faith in the German Civil Code which refers to the absence of knowledge that the
property belongs to a third person. See Quint, supra note 38, at 553:
"Certainly it seems likely that most purchasers of property knew or could easily have discovered
that what they were purchasing or receiving was property that had originally been expropriated".
The term "in redlicher Weise" therefore seems to be more in line with § 4(3) of the Property Law,
according to which an acquisition is dishonest, if it violated G.D.R. law, or if the transaction was the result
of coercion or deception.
l27
Quint, supra note 38, at 553-54.
l28
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 249.
129
Quint, supra note 38, at 554 n.291.
130
Article 1 reads as follows: The expropriations made based upon the foundation of occupation law or
occupation sovereignty (1945-1949) are not to be revoked. The governments of the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic see no possibility to revise the measures taken at that time. In light of the
historical development, the Federal Republic of Germany takes notice of this position. It is of the opinion
that a final decision on any possible government of compensation must be reserved for a future German
Parliament. Frank, supra note 9, at 822 n.68.
131
Quint, supra note 38, at 546.
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arguing that a present recognition by the F.R.G. of the expropriations violated the
constitutional guarantee of private property which is laid down in Article 14 of the Basic
Law. 132 Furthermore, it was alleged that excluding the 1945-1949 expropriations from the
general principle of restitution ofproperty constituted a violation of the equality principle set
forth in Article 3 of the Basic Law. 133 To protect the contested provision from attack in the
Bundesverfassungsgericht. the drafters of the Unification Treaty amended Article 143(3) to
the Basic Law, stating that "Article 41 of the Unification Treaty [incorporating the Joint
Declaration], and regulations in pursuance thereof, will remain permanent to the extent that
they provide that incursions on property are not to be undone."
There is much speculation about why the 1 945-1 949 expropriations were not included
in the restitution regime. According to P. E. Quint, "the vast amount of property involved —
3.3 million ha, apparently still one-third of the agricultural property of the G.D.R. (footnote
omitted) — doubtless played a central role. The G.D.R. government apparently feared
substantial social unrest if thousands of farming families, who had exercised some control
over collective property, were suddenly to see this property transferred to large landowners
from the west."
134
Others believe that it was in fact the West German government which
promoted the contested Article 1. Many West Germans suspect that the Ministry of Finance
wanted to retain the former "people's property" of the G.D.R., in order to relieve the budget
of part of the cost of unification.
135 Moreover, some say that West and South Germans are
letting themselves be governed by "highly irrational" resentments against former large
landowners, who are, in many cases, aristocrats. 136
132






Circular Letter from Heiko Peters, Member of the Board, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Hamburg,
enclosure 2 (concerning "the re-establishment ofjustice for the victims of the Communist expropriations
from 1945 to 1949") (on file with author).
136
Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Federal Minister of Justice, Alles ist aeusserst irrational, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [FAZ], Feb. 2, 1996.
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2. Unification Treaty
The Unification Treaty ofAugust which was concluded on August 30, 1990 officially
brought about the reunification of East and West Germany. Article 41 integrated the contents
of the Joint Declaration into the Treaty, but went beyond the Declaration in that it provided
for another exception to the restitution principle: If the property at issue was needed for
urgent investment purposes, particularly for the establishment of an industrial enterprise
which creates or safeguards jobs, the investment would have priority over restitution to the
former owner.
137






The Property Law 139 was formulated by the East German parliament (Volkskammer)
in implementation of the basic principles set forth in the Joint Declaration. It was first ratified
as part of the Unification Treaty. Like the Declaration, it reflected the policy to favor
restitution of property over compensation, notwithstanding the owner's right to choose
compensation instead of restitution.
140
"Property" within the meaning of the law included real
estate and rights in real estate (easements and mortgages), as well as chattels, claims against
debtors, and equity interests in corporations.
141 Under the law, natural persons as well as legal
persons were entitled to raise claims.
142
Going beyond both the Joint Declaration and the Unification Treaty, the Property
Law recognized a general right to restitution for "citizens and organizations that were
persecuted during the period of January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945, for racial, political,
'^Unification Treaty, supra note 122, art. 41(2).
138
A/.Art. 41(2) is specified by the Investment law, infra note 144.
139
Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermogensfragen (Vermogensgesetz)[Act on the Regulation of Open
Property Questions], v. 18.4.1991 (BGB1. I S.957) [hereinafter Property Law].
140




Property Law, supra note 139, § 2(1).
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religious or ideological (weltanschaulich) reasons, and, due to such persecution, had lost
their property through forced sales, confiscations or other measures.
143
Apart from applying
to Jews who fled Germany during the Third Reich, this provision also accommodated claims




In specification ofArt.41(2) of the Unification Treaty, the Investment Law 145 , ratified
at the same time as the Property Law, set forth the conditions under which an investment
project took precedence over restitution of the property at issue. The current holder could sell
the property to an investor in spite of pending restitution claims, if the investment was used
"to ensure or create jobs, particularly through the establishment of a business", "to meet
significant housing needs", or "to develop the infrastructure required for the former
activities".
146 The potential investor had to present a plan outlining the planned investment. 147
If he was deemed financially capable of executing that plan, the local administration would
issue an investment certificate which would enable the investor to implement his project.
148
However, the certificate was not issued, if an administrative or judicial decision previously
ordered restitution of the property at issue.
149 The Law also imposed a deadline, requiring




See supra p. 4 et sequ.
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Gesetz iiber besondere Investitionen in dem in Artikel 3 des Einigungsvertrages genannten Gebiet










Id, § 2 (2). The deadline was extended to Dec. 31, 1993, according to the Impediments Removal Law,
infra note 151.
25
If an investor had duly required an investment certificate, the former owner was not
allowed to prevent the development of the property, although he was entitled to
compensation in the amount of the proceeds from the sale to the investor. 151
5. Amendments
When investment was not occurring as rapidly as necessary to spark the moribund
East German economy, the German parliament (Bundestag), in March 1991, passed the Law
Governing the Removal ofImpediments to the Privatization of Enterprises. 152 The slow pace
of investment was due to the confusing and lengthy process investors had to undergo to
obtain clear title.
153
Potential investors were "discouraged . . . from buying property without
guarantees against pending and future restitution claims." 154
Under the Property Law, once a restitution claim had been filed, all transactions
regarding the property had to be suspended.
153 The Impediments Removal Law improved the
investor's status in that it removed this moratorium, in the case that the current owner was
a governmental entity or the Trust Agency.
156
According to the amended Property Law, the
Trust Agency which, unlike the government agencies covered by the Investment Law, owned
companies in addition to real estate and buildings, 157 could transfer or lease holdings
regardless of restitution claims so long as it promoted healthy investment.
158
Moreover, the
decisions of the Trust Agency were not subject to approval by any other governmental
151
Frank, supra note 9. at 836.
1 52
~Gesetz zur Beseitigung von Hemmnissen bei der Privatisierung von Unternehmen, v. 22.3.1991 ( BGB1.
I S.766) [hereinafter Impediments Removal Law].
153
Frank, supra note 9, at 841
.
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Heslop & Roberto, supra note 2 1 , at 26 1
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Property Law, supra note 139, § 3(3).
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The Trust Agency (Treuhandanstalt) was created through the Law on the Privatization and
Reorganization of the People's Property (Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen
Vermogens, v. 22.6.1990 (BGB1 1 S.33) [hereinafter Trust Law].). A fiduciary holding in trust the all assets
of the former East German state, the Trust Agency became the world's largest holding company,
administrating over 12,600 companies, over 24,000 retail proprietorships, 25 billion square meters of real
estate, and 9.6 billion square meters of forest. See Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 251-54.
57
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 2 1 , at 26 1
.
158
Property Law, supra note 139, § 3a, codified as amended at 1991 BGB1. I S.957.
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entity.
159 The Investment Law was also amended, in order to streamline the cumbersome
certification process.
160
In spite of these amendments, the East German economy recovered only
marginally.
161
Consequently, the German government, in July 1992, amended the Property
Law once more and enacted the Investment Priority Law. 162 To shorten the length of
proceedings, the amendment imposed final deadlines for restitution claimants; after the
deadline had passed, restitution and compensation claims of the former owner were void. 163
This regulation contrasted sharply with prior practice, according to which failure to comply
with a deadline had not resulted in the forfeiture of a claim.
164 The Investment Priority Law
further expanded investment exceptions to restitution, and essentially established a general
policy of "investment over restitution over compensation." Moreover, the proceedings
regarding the obtainment of an investment certificate were simplified. 165
Due to the significant inroads these amendments made on the fundamental rule giving
priority to restitution, they have been much criticized. However, while trying to balance
former owners' individual rights (to equality and private property) against the need for




Throughout the former Soviet bloc, the Czech Republic is the only other country,
apart from Germany, which decided, while still part of Czechoslovakia, to return all property
159
Heslop and Roberto, supra note 21. at 262.
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Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 261.
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expropriated by the Communist government. 167 The Czechoslovak government and the
majority in the Federal Assembly believed that "restitution was needed not only to do justice,
but also to help create an entrepreneurial class that would strengthen the private sector during
a critical period."
168
1 . First Restitution Act
The so-called First Restitution Act (Act on the Alleviation of Certain Property
Injustices),
169 was adopted by the Czechoslovak Parliament on Oct.2, 1990. It provided for
the restitution to former owners or their heirs, of immovable and movable property
expropriated by the Communist government in accordance with certain laws and decrees
adopted in 1955 and 1959. 170 In particular, the First Restitution Act referred to privately
owned apartment houses expropriated under Act. No. 71 171 and some properties taken by
local District National Committees under Government Decree No. 15. 172 The majority of the
properties encompassed by the First Restitution Act were small businesses owned by
individuals and apartment buildings in urban areas. All in all, the Act only covered a small
amount of property expropriated by the Communists.
17j
But, compared to subsequent
legislation, the group of entitled persons under the Act was rather large. Even aliens could
claim restitution or compensation, provided that their claims had not been settled by bilateral
international treaties concluded between Czechoslovakia and their domiciliary country.
17 "4
Vratislav Pechota, Privatization and Foreign Investment in Czechoslovakia: The Legal Dimension, 24
Vand. J. Transnat'lL. 305, 309 (1991).m
Id.
169
Act No. 403 zakon c. 10/1990 Sb., amended by Act No. 458 zakon c. 10/1990 Sb., and Act No. 137 zakon
c.4/1991 Sb., translated in 1 CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed.
1990) [hereinafter First Restitution Act].
l70




Government Decree No. 15 zakon c. 3/1 959 Sb., see Mahulena Hoskova, The Evolving Regime ofthe
New Property Law in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 7 AM. U. J. iNT'L L. & POL'Y 605, 608
(1992).
l73
Pechota, supra note 167, at 310.
,74
Hoskova, supra note 172, at 608.
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Potential claimants had to file their claims within six months after the First Restitution Act
entered into force. The claimant had the burden of proof regarding his entitlement and
regarding expropriation under the particular decrees covered by the Act. 175 If he was
successful in proving his right to the property, the party possessing it was required to enter
into a contractual agreement with the claimant whereby title and possession would be
transferred.
176 Although the Czechoslovak government refused to return property in which
third parties, private companies, or foreigners had bona fide title, it offered just and equitable
compensation to the former owners in such cases. 177
2. Second Restitution Act
On February 21, 1991, the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, following a "long and
acrimonious debate,"
178
passed the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitatiori.79 The Law was
particularly controversial, since it provided for the return of, or compensation for properties
valued at more than ten billion dollars — "the transfer of wealth on an unprecedented
scale."
180 The Second Restitution Act authorized restitution of all property expropriated in
the period from the Communist takeover on February 25, 1948 to the end of 1989. 181 Only
individuals, no legal persons were entitled under the Act. Claimants had to be Czechoslovak
citizens and permanent residents of Czechoslovakia.
182
Like the First Restitution Act, the
Second Act required the claimant to negotiate directly with the party possessing the
property.
183
Restitution claims could be filed until October 1, 1 99 1.
184
If the parties did not
175




Pechota, supra note 167, at 310.m
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Act No. 87 zakon c.3/1991 Sb., amended by Decree No. 392 of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak
Republic, Oct. 4, 1991, and Reg. No. 289 zakon £.6/ 1991 Sb., translated in 1991 U.S. Dep't of Commerce
Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts [hereinafter Second Restitution Act].
180
Hoskova, supra note 172, at 609.
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reach an agreement, the case could be submitted to a court until April 1, 1992.
185 Where a
building had decreased or increased in value, the claimant was entitled to choose financial
compensation over restitution. 186 He was confined to compensation where the original
character of the building or land holding had changed substantially. 187 Compensation was to
be paid in cash or in government-issued bonds.
Despite its broad coverage, the Second Restitution Act did not provide for restitution
of property owned by churches, and of property taken for state agricultural purposes. 188
Neither did it return property nationalized by the Benes government (1945-1948). i.e.
property ofGermans, Hungarians, and others deemed disloyal to Czechoslovakia after World
War II. 189 After the split of the C.S.F.R., the Czech Republic proceeded to implement the
provisions of the federal program with only few minor modifications. 190
Under both Restitution Acts, restitution claims take precedence over privatization.
This means that a business, prior to initiating a privatization process, had to examine whether
a private owner for the property at issue existed. If that was the case, the privatization action
had to be deferred until the period specified for the submission of claims had expired.
191
3. Privatization
It is important to note that privatization legislation enacted by the Czechoslovak
parliament did not apply to properties for which claims were filed under the aforementioned
Restitution Acts. The Small-Scale Privatization Act (Act Concerning the Transfer of Some
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on December 1, 1990 192 covered small industrial, business, or service establishments other
than utilities or public services (over 120,000 businesses nationwide).
193 Any Czechoslovak
citizen or any individual who held citizenship for any period of time after 1948 could obtain
private ownership of these enterprises, which were sold to the highest bidder at public
auctions held by the respective (Czech or Slovak) Republic. 194 As of 1992, 10,000 enterprises
had been privatized. 195
Privatization of larger businesses was launched on February 27, 1991 through
enactment of the Large-Scale Privatization Act (Act on Conditions of Transferring State
Property to Other Persons).
196
It applied to approximately 4,000 firms tentatively valued at
some 130 billion dollars, but left certain industries, such as railroads, nuclear power stations,
and telecommunications under government ownership.
197 The Act provided for privatization
through various methods, i.e. the creation ofjoint stock or limited liability companies, direct
sales to domestic or foreign investors, transfer of properties to municipalities, and the
concept of investment vouchers.
198 Any privatization project had to be submitted to the
republic or federal privatization ministries for approval. Direct sales to foreign investors had
to be approved by the government.
199
The Act created the Federal Fund of National Property whose duties included
acquisition of properties, sale of those properties to individual investors, or promotion of
joint stock companies and sale of the shares. The Fund also exercised shareholder's rights
192
Act No. 427 zakon c. 10/1990 Sb., translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS,
supra note 169.
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Hoskova, supra note 172, at 610.
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Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 84 (1993).
196
Act No. 92 zakon c.2/1991 Sb., translated in 1 CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS,
supra note 169.
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in the companies it owned. 200 When Czechoslovakia broke apart, the task of carrying out
privatization was entrusted to the Czech and Slovak Funds ofNational Property respectively.
To cope with the problem of inadequate domestic capital, the Large-Scale
Privatization Act introduced a coupon voucher method. Coupon booklets for bidding on
shares in state firms allowed every citizen over 18 years of age to participate in the
program.
201
Before the division of the country, almost 1,500 firms were transferred to the
public. But, despite attempts at a smooth transition, the split into two separate states has
slowed down privatization significantly. 202 Especially the division of federal assets was
problematic. While the Czech government stressed the importance to privatize quickly,
continued direct sales to foreign investors, and started to transfer shares to coupon holders,
the Slovaks put greater emphasis on the economic situation of the population. Priority was
given to public tenders, public auctions, and direct sales, while the voucher method was
considered inefficient and waspushed into the background. 203
4. Federal Land Law
Agricultural privatization was realized through the Czech and Slovak Act on the
Regulation of the Relations of Ownership of Land and Other Agrarian Property of May 21,
1991 (Federal Land Law).
204
In Czechoslovakia, unlike in the Soviet Union, nationalization
of farm land only extended to the use of those lands. This meant that private owners
remained in place while the government designated specific agricultural objectives for the
nationalized land.




Balfour & Crise, supra note 195. The coupon booklets cost the equivalent of about one week's salary
and went on sale in October, 1991. About 8.5 million citizens participated in the program, after a number of





ActNo. 229 zakon c.8/1991 Sb., translated in 1991 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Central & Eastern Europe
Legal Texts [hereinafter Federal Land Law].
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Hoskova, supra note 172, at 612.
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they were Czechoslovak citizens residing in the country.206 It also covered property which
had been the subject of a forced transfer to the state.
207 Land nationalized before February 25,
1948 was not subject to restitution under the Act. 208 Like the Restitution Acts, the Federal
Land Law imposed a time limit for filing of claims which had to be exercised before
December 31, 1992. 209 The compensation regulation is similar to that under the Second
Restitution Act.
210
On Apr. 15, 1992, the Czech Republic, while still a part of the federal state, amended
the Federal Land Law to return to a limited extent property confiscated from ethnic Germans
and Hungarians under the Benes decrees.
21
' The amendment provided for an additional group
of entitled persons, subject to a number of conditions: To be eligible, the person had to have
reacquired Czechoslovak citizenship prior to the time of the amendment and by virtue of one
of three statutes or a Constitutional Decree listed in the provision.
212
In addition, the property
concerned had to have passed to the Czechoslovak state pursuant to the Benes decrees
213
and,
most importantly, the person could not have committed a wrong against the Czechoslovak
state.
206





Id., § 16; see supra Part 2.
21
'Act No. 243 zakon c.243/1992 Sb.
2X2
Id., § 2(1). Persons had to have reacquired citizenship pursuant to either Act No. 245/1948 Sb. (On
citizenship of ethnic Hungarians), Act No. 194/1949 Sb. (on the acquisition and loss of Czechoslovak
citizenship), or Act No. 34/1953 Sb. (by which certain persons acquired Czechoslovak citizenship), unless
they had already become citizens according to Constitutional Decree of the President of the Republic No.
33/1945 Sb. (on the regulation of the Czechoslovak citizenship of persons of German and Hungarian
nationality). I wish to thank Mark Gillis for providing me with this detailed information.
2X3
Id. The provision lists Decree of the President of the Republic No. 12/1945 Sb. (on the confiscation and
sped-up division of agricultural property of Germans, Hungarians, as well as traitors and enemies of
Czechoslovakia) and Decree of the President of the Republic No. 108/1945 Sb. (On the confiscation of
enemy property and the funds of national renewal).
33
5 . Restitution ofJewish Property
In January 1 994. the Czech government announced a draft law under which properties
of the Jewish community in the Czech Republic such as synagogues, cemeteries, libraries
and other community buildings, were to be restored. 214 The properties at issue were
confiscated by the Nazis as early as 1938, were subsequently nationalized by the Comumsts,
and, as of 1994, were in the hands of the Czech state. This draft law marked a decisive break
with the existing Czech restitution laws, which covered only properties confiscated after
February 1948.
215
Opposition to the draft law argued that making an exception to the rule that
properties taken before 1948 would not be restored, would open the way for much broader
claims than those of the Jewish community. It would strengthen the cases of the Czech
Catholic Church and the Sudeten Germans seeking restitution or compensation for their
properties which were also taken prior to 1948.
216 On April 29, 1994 the Czech Parliament
passed an amendment to the Second Restitution Act217 which allowed for the restitution of
202 former communally-owned Jewish properties.
218
Moreover, the amendment provided for
the return of private property or the payment of compensation "to individuals or their heirs




provision effectively precludes restitution claims of Sudeten Germans whose expropriation
under the 1945 Benes decrees rested on their nationality.
220
In light of the strong
parliamentary opposition which feared an "avalanche of Sudeten German claims,"
221
the
government limited the scope of the amendment in this fashion, in order to make it pass.
214
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However, Jewish claims under the amendment do not extend to former state property that
was transferred to municipalities or sold off in privatization projects. 222
6. Sudeten German Claims
Sudeten German property was confiscated through the decrees issued by the Benes
government on June 21, 1945 and Oct. 25, 1945.
223
Since the Second Restitution Act only
covered property expropriated between 1948 and 1989, Sudeten German claims to restitution
have no legal basis. Although the amendment to the Federal Land Law provided for the
limited restitution of land formerly owned by ethnic Germans (or Hungarians),224 the
requirements that the amendment sets forth regarding the entitled person effectively preclude
most Sudeten German claims. To qualify for restitution under the amendment, a person must
have been expropriated under the Benes decrees and must have remained loyal to the
Czechoslovak state. However, those who lost their property under the 1945 decrees did so
because they could not prove their loyalty to Czechoslovakia at the time.
225
Unless they were
rehabilitated by the Czechoslovak government in the late 1940s, they are therefore prevented
from qualifying for restitution, for they will not be able to prove their loyalty. Unwilling to
accept this situation, the strong and politically active Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft,
preceded by its leader Neubauer, has not ceased to pressure both the Czech and German
governments to take Sudeten German interests into account.
In 1973, the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia signed a treaty which




" See supra note 213.
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See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
:25
According to § 2(1) of Act No. 243/1992 Sb., the claimant had to have reacquired citizenship under the
statutes listed there. However, ethnic Germans and Hungarians lost their citizenship pursuant to Decree No.
108/1945 Sb., unless they could prove their loyalty. See Mark Gillis, Facing Up to the Past: The Czech
Constitutional Court 's Decision on the Confiscation ofSudeten German Property, 2 PARKER SCH. J. E.
EUR. L. 709, 720 (1995). In the decision, the Constitutional Court rejected the petition of Rudolf Dreithaler
to declare Decree No. 108/1945 inconsistent with the Czech Constitution.
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See Schiller, supra note 44.
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"void with regard to their mutual relations."227 This language constitutes a German
reservation regarding the Munich Agreement's repudiation, although the parties agreed that,
in principle, the Munich Agreement, having been imposed upon Czechoslovakia by force,
was void under customary international law. The reservation preserves the legal validity of
civil acts performed under German law in the Sudetenland between 1938 and 1945 228 while
repudiating all other aspects of the Agreement. 229 The 1973 Treaty does not mention the issue
of expropriation.
The Treaty ofGood Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation concluded between the
reunited Germany and Czechoslovakia on February 28, 1992 230 covers a broad range of
social, economic, and political issues, but again leaves open the question of restitution of
Sudeten German properties. Neither does it mention the Munich Agreement, a fact that
stirred apprehension among the Czechs, considering that many Sudeten Germans still
contend validity of the Agreement to support their restitution claims. 231 The Treaty has been
much criticized for failing to resolve these problems. 232
The Sudeten German question was addressed for the first time in the Declaration of
Reconciliation signed between the Czech Republic and Germany on January 21, 1997. In the
document, Germany expresses sorrow for the 1938-1945 Nazi occupation of Czech territory,
while the Czech Republic apologizes for the postwar expulsion of 2.5 million ethnic
Germans from the Sudetenland. 233 Although claimed to put an end to "the stormy rhetoric
of German and Czech history,"234 the declaration offers no final, legally binding solutions to
27
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the problem of compensation for Czech victims of Nazi occupation nor to the matter of
Sudeten German restitution claims. 235 While German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was reported,
after signing the declaration, to have said that the question of restitution claims remains open,
Czech President Vaclav Havel declared that the accord meant that Germany would not back
Sudeten German property demands. 2360n the other hand, the Czechs "want to leave open the
question of individual compensation for victims of Nazi terror, a matter that the Kohl
government has refused to consider before the resolution of the Sudeten question."237 The
issue is so heavily charged with emotions, Czech fear ofGerman domination on one side and
Sudeten German demands for justice pressuring the German government on the other, that
a solution is not yet in sight.
7. Czech Catholic Church
While monasteries, schools and residences belonging to the Czech Catholic Church
have been returned under the Restitution Acts, the big outstanding claim is the church's
demand for its land. 238 Of its forest and other land that was confiscated under Communism,
175,000 ha are exempt from the Second Restitution Act.
239
In July of 1996, the minority
government under Vaclav Klaus proposed to restore to the Catholic Church ownership of the
land and, in return, to phase out state subsidies to the church.
240 The opposition Social
Democrats and Communists objected to the proposal, claiming that the land at issue is public
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minority government would not be likely to be able to push a bill through parliament. 242 But,
according to Czech law, a transfer of land by decree is only permissible if the state possesses
the land at issue contrary to law. However, since more than 90% of the church's land was
transferred to state ownership, state possession of that land was legal, which allows only for
transfer by parliamentary statute.
243
In light of the opposition's refusal to restore church
property, it seems unlikely that a corresponding law will be passed in the near future.
242
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C. Poland
While most Eastern European countries have adopted legislation dealing with the
restitution of property nationalized by their former Communist regimes, Poland is an
exception. At the time of this writing, Poland has been grappling with the issue for seven
years, but none of the many drafts presented to the lower house ofparliament (Sejm) has met
its approval.
244 One of the reasons for this condition is that the power of government in
Poland has changed hands frequently over the past few years. After the Solidarity movement
had toppled the Communist regime in 1989, more than 30 small fractions formed within the
trade union and split up the right-wing alliance. 245 This resulted in the victory of the ex-
Communists in the 1993 elections and led to Lech Walesa's loss of the presidency to ex-
Communist Aleksander Kwasniewski in 1995.246 Although the present government (the
Democratic Left Alliance of former Communists together with the Polish Peasant Party)
came rather close to enacting a restitution law in June of 1 996, the issue was again suspended
in light of the approaching 1997 election campaign. As Jan WyrowiAski, a member of the
Parliamentary subcommittee on the restitution law, puts it: "Each time the work of the
committee comes to an end, the same happens to the Parliament's term."
247
Another reason
is the strong position of the former Communists in the Sejm in general. The Democratic Left
Alliance (SLD) supports the prior Communist laws and resists the overall concept of
returning property to its prior owners."
Despite the fact that no restitution law has passed so far, Poland's ministries, courts
and organizations have received about 200,000 claims from former owners.
249 What follows
244
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is an introduction of the different drafts for a restitution law that have been submitted since
1991.
1. 1991 Government Bill
In the late spring of 1991, the Ministry of Ownership Transformations submitted a
restitution bill in reaction to over 1 0,000 restitution claims which had been filed with the
ministry in absence of any parliamentary directives. 250 The government draft stated that
property would not be returned unless it was taken under violation of Communist laws. 251
Privatization Minister Janusz Lewandowski defended this policy with the argument that full
restitution to former owners would greatly hinder privatization efforts. He reasoned that "if
we question acts of nationalization and land reform we will question the whole postwar legal
structure in Poland."
252
Taking on a suggestion by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz,
former owners would be given coupons rather than replacement in kind. They would be able
to sell the coupons on the stock exchange or use them to buy shares in newly privatized
companies.
253
Restitution in kind would only be possible in a very limited number of cases. 254
Entitled persons were natural persons who were Polish citizens and domiciled in Poland.
Although persons living abroad were officially entitled to remedies if they acquired Polish
citizenship and domicile, this condition was de facto impossible to fulfil before expiration
of the deadline to file claims.
255
It is worth noting that the bill went as far as to offer
compensation for property located in former Polish territory that became part of the Soviet
Union after World War II. 256 The government draft bill prevailed in the readings, but lapsed
in early 1992 without being passed.
257
250
















The government's policies were sharply criticized by former property owners who
rejected their focus on fiscal considerations.258 In response to such protest. President Walesa
issued a restitution plan which called for all-out restitution. While his party (Solidarity)
favored only partial compensation, Walesa himself advocated restitution in kind rather than
compensation in government bonds. 259 Although the President's program was based on a
strong sense of morality and justice, fiscal realities made it impossible for such radical
proposals to subsist in Parliament.
260
3. "Coalition ofThree " Bill
In early 1992 three different bills were introduced to the Sejm of which only the
Coalition of Three Bill survived until the end of that year.
261
It was promoted by three center-
left parties and substantially followed the 1991 government proposal, i.e. that property
should only be returned if taken in violation of the Communist law.262 Apart from natural
persons, companies with headquarters in Poland at the time of nationalization should be
eligible for restitution/compensation. The bill was rejected by the Sejm, because the majority
in the lower house preferred to draft a restitution law that scaled down the claims to meet the
state's fiscal abilities.
263
4. Suchoka Government Bill
This bill which the new government of Prime Minister Hanna Suchoka presented in
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where such remedies were barred,264 for compensation in interest-free government
securities.
26 The Suchoka Bill is more favorable towards former owners in that it takes a
cut-off-date approach: rather than focusing on the legitimacy of a confiscation under
Communist law, it deems all expropriations effected between 1 944 (after the land reform)
and 1960 illegal.
266
Restitution of farmland would be limited to 100 ha, restitution of forest
to 25 ha. Where property was part of an agricultural cooperative, restitution would depend
on the cooperative's consent.267 As under the 1991 Government Bill and under the Coalition
of Three Bill, claimants would have to be or become Polish citizens and residents of
Poland.
268
Since the Suchoka Bill met with considerable approval, even among former owners,
it seemed likely that the Sejm would pass it. However, as a result of a non-confidence vote
cast for the Suchoka government in the spring of 1993, legislative action was suspended until
the elections in the fall. The government which emerged from the elections, a coalition of the
SLD and the PSL (Peasant Party), intended to modify restitution. 269 Coalition experts called
for a restitution formula that would not "undermine the state's interest and the interest of
citizens."
270
they suggested to limit restitution to cases of "flagrant violation of the
[Communist] law."271
264
Like its predecessors, the Suchoka Bill barred restitution where the property at issue is under public use
or is held by natural persons.
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5. Current State ofAffairs
In the first half of 1995, several new drafts for a restitution bill were introduced. The
proposals made by the Presidency and by the Freedom Union both provided for restitution
in kind, and envisaged compensation in government bonds only if restitution was impossible.
On the grounds that they burdened the state budget too strongly, the Sejm rejected both these
drafts.
272
The government's draft law did not foresee any restitution in kind, and restricted
compensation in bonds to three groups of former owners: those who were expropriated under
violation of the Communist law, those who were supposed to receive compensation under
Communist law, but never did, and those whose property was situated in the territories ceded
to the Soviet Union.
273
This draft is substantially similar to the current draft pending in the
Sejm. However, various issues are still unresolved, the opposition demanding that
compensation should apply to all nationalized property and that there should be restitution
in kind.
274
Another issue under debate is who should be eligible for claims: only Polish
citizens and residents or people who were citizens at the time of expropriation and intend to
return to Poland. The draft bill recognizes claims of spouses, lineal heirs and shareholders
of nationalized corporations, provided the claimant is a resident of Poland.
275
The restitution law will likely not be passed before the 1997 parliamentary elections.
According to latest press reports, a newly emerged right-wing alliance that has formed
around Solidarity has a chance of beating the ruling coalition.
276
It is hard to imagine that the
current draft law would survive a change in parliamentary leadership.
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6. Restitution ofJewish Property
On February 20, 1997, the Sejm passed a bill enabling Poland's nine current-existing
Jewish communities (with 1,220 members) to apply for restitution of the property that was
taken from these communities prior to September 1, 1939.
277 The bill only provides for the
restitution of property of religious communities (synagogues, cemeteries etc.), but does not
apply to hospitals and formerly privately owned apartment buildings. 278 The chairman of the
World Federation of Polish Jews, Stefan Grayek and the vice-chairman of the World Jewish
Restitution Organization (WJRO), Naphtali Lavie have criticized the bill, arguing that it
limits restitution to a minimalist amount and does not return to the Jewish communities all
property they owned before 1939, the value of which Lavie considers to be "inestimable."279
Moreover, the bill is questioned because it allocates the generated funds exclusively to the
few members of contemporary Polish Jewish communities, bypassing the "legitimate
recipients", the WJRO and the World Federation, who represent the 1.5 million Jews of
Polish origri or descent living elsewhere in the world.
280 The Union of Jewish Communities
in Poland, albeit aware of its flaws, welcomed the bill. Its head, Pawel Wildstein stated that
"the Union and I are fairly pleased that after 800 years of our existence on Polish soil we
have got a basic document like this law regulating relations between the state and the
Jews."
281
7. Polish Catholic Church
While the Polish government delayed restitution of Jewish communal property, the
communal property of other religious groups was returned more promptly. A law passed in
1989 governed the return of property formerly owned by the Polish Catholic Church,
211
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Chapter IV
Analysis of Restitution Regimes under International
and National Constitutional Law
A. Germany
The rules laid down in the Unification Treaty for the restitution of expropriated
property have been attacked mainly on one ground: Former owners whose property was
confiscated during the period of Soviet occupation (1945-1949) consider the rule that
exempts them from recovering their property to be unconstitutional and to violate
international law.
The Property Law283 determines that, in principle, property that was nationalized
without adequate compensation is to be returned to its former owners.
284
According to §
l(8)(a) of the Statute, property taken between 1945 and 1949 is exempt from that principle,
i.e. is not subject to restitution. This legislation was enacted in implementation of Art. 1 of
the Joint Declaration
285 which sets forth the irreversibility of the 1945-1949 expropriations.
Although the Joint Declaration left open the possibility of future compensation, those
concerned by this exemption felt it violated their constitutional rights to private property and
equality under the Basic Law.
286
Property Law, supra note 139.
28V,§i.
285
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1 . Judgment ofthe Bundesverfassungsgericht ofApril 23, 1991
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Federal Constitutional Court, issued a
verdict in response to a number of constitutional complaints that fourteen victims of Soviet
occupational expropriations had lodged.287 The complainants alleged that Art. 41 of the
Unification Treaty
288 which incorporates the contested Art. 1 of the Joint Declaration violated
their rights to private property and equality under the Basic Law. However, Art. 41 of the
Unification Treaty is protected by the amended Art. 143(3) of the Basic Law which declares
the constitutional validity of Art. 41.
289
Therefore, the complainants had to challenge the
constitutionality of Art. 143(3). The Court found that Art. 143(3) was constitutional.
Every amendment to the Basic Law is subject to the rules laid down in Art. 79 of that
Law. According to Art. 79(3), amendments affecting the principles laid down in Articles 1
and 20 shall be prohibited. Although the right to private property (Art. 14) and the guarantee
of equality (Art. 3) are not explicitly mentioned in Art. 79(3), the latter provision protects all
other fundamental rights as far as the order established by Art. 1 requires to maintpin those
rights.
290 The Bundesverfassungsgericht concludes that the legislature may not touch upon
the core of any fundamental right in amending the Basic Law, but may modify such rights
for objective reasons.
291
The Court continues to determine whether the decision of the legislature on the
irreversibility of the 1945-1949 expropriations violated the right to private property. Since
the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany was limited to the former
territory of West Germany (Art. 23 s. 1), such is the reasoning of the Court, the Federal
Republic cannot be held responsible for measures of the sovereign power in the Soviet Zone,
287
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although it might have deemed such measures illegal.292 Moreover, the Basic Law could not
serve as a standard for determining the legitimacy of such measures, because it did not come
into effect until 1949.
In addition, the Bundesverfassungsgericht invokes the territoriality principle of
customary international law. This principle functions as a basis for the doctrines of sovereign
immunity and act of state. 293 In the case of the land reform expropriations, it dictates that the
Federal Republic regard those measures as inviolable, since they were executed within the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign power. 294 The Court does not invoke the "ordre public"
exception to the territoriality principle . It declines to consider the implementation of
Communist social policy through the land reform so egregious a violation of the Federal
Republic's public policy that the Federal Republic would have to deny recognition to the
land reform measures.
295
With respect to international legal rules the expropriations may have violated, the
Court's reasoning is very brief. If the victims had had a claim to restitution of their property
due to a violation of international law, that claim would have been directed against the
occupying power and would not have been enforceable. It was therefore irrelevant for the
decision of the legislature to exempt land reform victims from restitution. 296
The judgment presents yet another reason why the German government is not obliged
to return land reform victims' property. The judges argue that even with regard to
expropriations that occurred prior to 1945 or after 1949, the government was not required
to provide restitution in kind. If it did so nonetheless, it made use of its considerable
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expropriation does not automatically entitle the land reform victims to claim restitution as
well.
297
In proceeding to determine whether the legislature violated the equality principle
under Article 3 of the Basic Law, the Court finds that this is not the case. The judges assert
that the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union conditioned their approval of
German reunification upon the Federal Republic's recognition of the irreversibility of the
land reform. This assertion was based on the testimony of the representatives of the West and
East German governments in the negotiations concerning the Unification Treaty and the
Moscow Treaty. 298 The government had a prerogative in assessing whether such a condition
was negotiable and, in accepting the condition, acted within the limits of this prerogative.299
Therefore, the legislature is not obliged to return property to victims of the land
reform. Nevertheless does the equality principle oblige the legislature to provide for financial
compensation of those concerned. In determining the amount of compensation, the
legislature may take into account the financial abilities of the state in light of the national
budget. This means that no obligation exists to compensate the full market value of the
properties at issue.
300
2. Challenges to the Judgment
In holding that Art. 143(3) was constitutional, the Bundesverfassungsgericht
prevented approximately eight million acres from becoming subject to restitution claims.
301
Naturally, this came as a relief to the German government.
302
But, whatever political
considerations may have driven the Court; from a legal perspective the judgment is
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a. Possible Violations of International Law by the Recognition of Soviet Occupational
Expropriations
In determining whether the recognition of the expropriations occurred in violation of
international law, the land reform measures themselves must not be confused with the
recognition the Federal Republic lent to these measures by signing the Joint Declaration. 303
The question at the core of the decision is, therefore, whether the act of recognition itself is
justified under international law.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht invokes the international legal principle of
territoriality to justify the government's act of recognition of the Soviet Occupational
expropriations.
304
According to international law, the legal competence of a state that
complements the state's territorial rights is referred to as territorial sovereignty which is, in
essence, the legal personality of statehood.
305 One of the principal corollaries of sovereignty
is the state's jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent
population living there.
306
Correlative to a state's right to sovereignty is its duty to respect
the territorial sovereignty of other states. In the Lotus Case of 1927, the Permanent Court of
International Justice decided with respect to jurisdiction, that "restrictions upon the
independence of States cannot be presumed."
307
The Bundesverfassungsgericht uses the concept of territorial sovereignty to explain
first, why the sovereignty of the Federal Republic did not extend to the Soviet Zone at the
time of the land reform. It was the duty of the Federal Republic not to intervene in the area
of exclusive jurisdiction of another sovereign.
308 which prevents the Federal Republic from
being responsible for the expropriations today.
309
Secondly, the Court reasons that territorial
m
See supra note 127. Art. 1 of the Joint Declaration states that the Federal Republic of Germany "takes
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sovereignty obliged the Federal Republic to recognize the expropriations, since they were
measures of a foreign sovereign.310
If one agrees with the Court that the Soviet Military Administration (SMAG) was in
fact sovereign,
311
one must take into account, however, that German law regarding
international expropriations recognizes an exception to the territoriality principle, where the
act of a foreign sovereign clashes with German public policy. 312 The Court does not consider
expropriations in order to implement Communist social policy a violation of German public
policy:
The fact that the expropriations occurred without compensation . . .
is not sufficient to deny to them recognition, so long as they concern property
located within the territory of the expropriating state.
313
This rather briefconsideration ofGerman public policy is controversial. On one hand,
it seems to disregard the circumstances under which the expropriations in the Soviet Zone
took place. The complainants and some commentators claim that the takings were not
designed simply as the transfer of property to the state, but were part of a general strategy
that aimed at the economical and physical destruction of the "class enemy'", the landowner. 314
Landowners were systematically deprived of their human rights, as expropriations were tied
to arrests, expulsions and even executions.
315
Punitive expropriations based on such a
strategy rather than on individual condemnable behavior arguably violate basic principles
of justice. 316 The Court, on the other hand, does not mention the cruel persecutions
31V,at 1600.
Opponents of the judgment assert that, in a formal sense, the expropriations were the work of Germans,
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expropriation victims suffered. In doing so. it implicitly refuses to acknowledge the
confiscatory, i.e. inhumane character of the expropriations. 317 Conversely, one expert in
international law contends that confiscations embedded in a strategy to destroy, economically
and physically, an entire ethnic group of people, constitute an act of genocide.
318 He
concludes that no public policy would support such acts, since, if that were the case, the
public policy at issue would clearly violate international law. 319 There is an argument to be
made that the same is true in the case in which a group is subject to discrimination for social
rather than racial reasons. This would mean that German public policy could not support the
land reform and would have dictated to the German government to deny recognition to the
property takings.
Furthermore, the land reform may have violated the international law of military
occupation as embodied in the Hague Convention. 320 If that is the case, German public policy
would likely dictate to not invoke the territoriality principle and to deny recognition to the
land reform expropriations. According to Article 43 of the Hague Convention, the military
occupant shall respect, '"unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the [hostile]
country." It is generally accepted that widespread expropriation was necessary "neither to
ensure public order and safety nor to maintain occupational authority"
321 and clearly violated
the system of land ownership which was still in place at the end of World War II. 322 There
is some debate, however, over whether the Allied Forces were subject to the Hague
Convention. If the Soviet presence in East Germany was that of a sovereign authority rather
than being occupational in nature, the international law of military occupation would not
17
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The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 205
Consol. T.S. 277, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE Laws OF War 44 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 1982) [hereinafter Hague Convention], and Annex to the Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S.
289, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra, at 48.
321
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 267.
322
Jeffress, supra note 37, at 530.
52
apply.
32 The Bundesverfassungsgericht regards the Soviet force as sovereign,
notwithstanding the fact that the expropriations partly ensued on the basis of the law of
occupation.
324 The Court argues that the expropriation measures, although passed and
enforced solely by German authorities, occurred pursuant to occupying sovereignty, because
they were promoted and supported by the Soviets who were in de facto control. 325 Other
sources argue that the Allied status was that of sovereign authority due to the unconditional
surrender of the German government. 326
The opposite view holds that, "as sovereignty lies in the people and not in their
government, the fact that their army has been totally defeated cannot divest them of their
entitlement."
327
Since the Allies did not annex the whole of the vanquished territory, the
argument goes, they did not automatically assume sovereignty.328 Consequently, the Hague
Convention would apply and render the land reform in the Soviet Zone unlawful under
international law of military occupation.
The Court does not mention the Hague Convention in the judgment. Thus it fails to
consider the land reform's possible violation of the Convention and the implications of such
a violation for the legal validity of the recognition of the land reform by the German
government. It remains unclear whether, in the case that the Soviet occupation expropriations
violated the Hague Convention, German public policy would not have dictated to the
German government to deny recognition to those expropriation measures.
323
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 267-68.
324
BVerfG, supra note 287, at 1597.
n5
/d ; Heslop & Roberto, supra note 2 1 , at 270.
326
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 269-70.
327
Eyal Benvenisti, Conflict of Laws and Belligerent Occupation: A Study in Comparative and
International Law 209 ( 1 990), quoted in Jeffress, supra note 37, at 530 n. 1 8.
328M
53
b. Possible Violation ofGerman Constitutional Law
aa. Guarantee to Private Property
The Bundesverfassungsgericht ascertains correctly that the Soviet Occupational
expropriations themselves cannot be judged by standards of the Basic Law, simply because,
at the time the land reform was implemented, the Basic Law was not yet in force.329
However, the recognition of the land reform expropriations would violate the Basic Law of
Germany, if the act of recognition in itself constituted a violation of the victims' right to
private property under Article 14, to the extent that property is protected under Article
79(3).
330
According to German constitutional law, an act of government does not violate the
right to property, unless the owner holds a valid title (Rechtsposition) . 33 ' In the case of the
land reform, the Court argues, the former owners had already been deprived of all property
at the time the West German government signed the Joint Declaration. Thus, the act of
recognition, i.e. the signature of the Declaration did not encroach upon their ownership
rights.
332
The Court contends, that in order to determine whether a valid title exists, one must
judge from the point of view of one particular legal order. 333 Judging on the basis of West
German law, the question whether the land reform victims still held a valid title, prior to the
formal recognition ofthe expropriations, depends on two conditions. First, the expropriations
would have to be void due to their violation of international law. Secondly, the recognition
of the expropriations by the West German government would have to be valid. If the
recognition itself was valid, former owners would have lost their titles through that act of
recognition. It would therefore have an expropriating effect.
329
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It is not entirely clear, whether a violation of the Hague Convention would have
resulted in nullity of the Soviet occupational expropriations.
334 The Court reasons that, even
so, the victims' resulting claims were unenforceable and consequently worthless and
concludes that the government did not "expropriate" any such title through its act of
recognition.
335
However, it can be argued that even if such claims were in fact unenforceable, the
recognition of the expropriations may have violated German public policy. 336 The
constitutional right to property as embodied in Article 79(3) demands that the state not
interfere directly with the essence of private property. Article 79(3) prohibits any
constitutional amendment touching upon the core of private property, i.e. the element of
property that forms a part of human dignity.337 Moreover, the state is obliged to pursue a
public policy that protects its citizens' property, rather than affirm foreign measures that
encroached or may have encroached upon their property rights. In light of the degrading and
discriminating circumstances unde; which the expropriations took place, their recognition
arguably impaired the human dignity element of the victims' potential titles and violated the
right to private property under the Basic Law.
Conversely, at least one commentator views the Court's refusal to condemn the
Soviet occupational expropriations as an indication that the constitutional right to property
is to be read more narrowly. 338
334Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Verfassungsrecht im Wandel21 1 (J. Ipsen et al. eds., 1995). In a later
decision of Apr. 18, 1996, the Bundesverfassungsgericht used this argument to defend the government's act
of recognition.
335
BVerfG, supra 287, at 1600.
33(>
See supra Part 2. a.
337





The preclusion of land reform victims from restitution may violate the equality
principle under Article 3 of the Basic Law. Two questions arise in this context. Was the
government's decision to restore some property to former owners (property taken before
1945 or after 1949) subject to government discretion or to a legal obligation? And secondly,
if some property is restored, does the decision to limit land reform victims to compensation
comply with the principle of equality before the law?339
The Bundesverfassungsgericht classifies all expropriations, those conducted by the
Soviets and those conducted by the East German government after 1 949, as "fortunes of war'''
(Kriegsfolgen)?
40
According to Article 23 of the Unification Treaty, the liabilities of the
former German Democratic Republic have become the responsibility of the unified German
state.
341
This seems to imply that the Federal Republic is liable for all Communist
expropriations, provided the takings constitute a wrong resulting in such liability. However,
the classification as "fortunes of war" precludes state liability and puts the question whether
reparations should be made at the government's discretion. 342 The government is merely
obliged to provide for an in-state equalization of burdens (innerstaatliche
Ausgleichsleistung) . It follows that even in the cases where the legislature did grant
restitution (for those expropriated before 1945 or after 1949), it was not legally bound to do
so.
343
Its legal obligation only extended to an equalization of burdens which does not require
the compensation of full market value.
The classification as "fortunes of war" is in itself debatable, because at the time the
land reform was implemented, the war had already ended. Moreover, the Court has been
339GG Art. 3 (F.R.G.).
340
BVerfG, supra note 287, at 1600; see also United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U. S. 149, 155 (1952), cited
in Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 286. The Supreme Court uses the same terminology in holding that
the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee that the United States will make whole all who suffer loss of
property in war.
Unification Treaty, supra note 122.
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accused of interpreting the term too broadly. 344 One aspect of such war consequences is that,
typically, restitution in kind is in fact impossible (e.g. due to destruction of the property).
Therefore, the classification should not apply where expropriated property is still under state
control and no other interest stands in the way of in-kind restitution. 345
The second question refers to whether the restitution regime, offering restitution in
kind or full compensation to some former owners, while denying both to others, violates the
equality principle.
346
Constitutional jurisdiction has read Article 3(1) of the Basic Law to
allow for unequal treatment where reasonable distinctions are made. The question is thus,
whether the distinction made by the legislature, i.e. to deny restitution and full compensation
to former owners who were expropriated between 1945 and 1949, is reasonable.
The Court bases the distinction on the alleged circumstance that the West German
government was forced to recognize the irreversibility of the land reform, in order to bring
about reunification.
347
Whether the distinction made by the legislature can thus be justified
is doubtful from a legal, as well as a factual point of view. To begin with, a distinction is
only reasonable if the reason given is related to the specific differences setting one group of
persons apart from another. In the present case, the victims of the land reform differ from the
other expropriation victims in that their property was taken at an earlier time, and that it was
taken before the foundation of the German Democratic Republic. 348 However, these
differences do not justify unequal treatment. The actual time of the taking is not a reasonable
distinction. Neither is the fact decisive that some property was taken after the formation of
the East German state. The 1945-1949 as well as the post- 1949 expropriations were executed
by German authorities, and the Soviets were in de facto control before and after the GDR
came into being.349 Takings of property were at any time measures of socialization and
Maurer, supra note 3 1 6, at 1 90.
345
Id
346GG Art.3(l) (F.R.G.) Art. 3(1) states: All people are equal before the law.
347
BVerfG, supra note 287, at 1 600-0 1
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collectivization to implement the Communist economical system. And public interest or
good faith acquisition by third parties which stand in the way of restitution equally exists for
property taken before and after 1949. 350 The distinction the legislature makes between
victims of the land reform and victims of later expropriations is therefore not a reasonable
one.
Furthermore, the accuracy of the testimony claiming that irreversibility of the land
reform was actually a condition for reunification is questionable. 351 In an interview with the
British historian Norman Stone on August 27, 1994, the last Soviet President Gorbatchev
denied that the issue of restitution of property taken under Soviet occupation had been part
of the negotiations to the Moscow Treaty. 352 Shortly thereafter, the former Soviet Foreign
Minister Schevardnadse declared in a television interview that the Soviet Union never
imposed any conditions concerning German reunification. 353 These statements were
confirmed by other witnesses such as former U.S. President Bush and his Secretary of State
James Baker.354
Also, the testimony of the German government claiming that the East German
negotiators insisted on irreversibility of the land reform must be doubted. It is highly unlikely
that the East German government had sufficient authority to force any such condition upon
the West German government. 355 There is also evidence to the opposite: The former Prime
Minister of Saxony-Anhalt Griess declared on September 19. 1996 in the presence of several
hundred listeners that the Volkskammer (Parliament of the German Democratic Republic)
35V
351
Property Wrongs, supra note 302, at 49.
352BVerfGE 94, 12 (18). In this subsequent decision, the Court acknowledged that the verdict of Apr. 23,
1991 relied on false facts, but concluded that this did not change the outcome of the case.
353M
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had supported the restitution of all state property. Only upon pressure from the West German
government, did the differing treatment of land reform victims become an issue.356
On account of these legal and factual faults, the legislative decision to exclude land
reform victims from restitution is not based upon a reasonable distinction and thus violates
the equality principle under the Basic Law. In failing to recognize this, the judgment of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht seems to have stricken the wrong balance. That it is essentially
political,
357
cannot change the fact that the judgment does not take the land reform victims'
constitutional rights sufficiently into account. From a legal point of view, this is not
acceptable.
3. Standard ofCompensation
Another issue that arises in examining the German restitution regime is whether the
compensation standard applied is in accord with international law.
The classification not only of the Soviet occupation but of all expropriations since
1945 as "fortunes of war", leads the Bundesverfassungsgericht to the conclusion that the
legislature's obligation to compensation is limited. Rather than restitution in kind, it is bound
by law only to provide for an "equalization of burdens" .
358
This means that, in light of the
overall cost of German reunification, former owners may receive less in compensation than
the full market value, since the financial supplies of the state are limited.
In addition, so the Court rules, the legislature may make reparations going beyond its
legal obligation to provide for the equalization of burdens. Having adopted responsibility for
all debts of the former German Democratic Republic whose legal order did not comply with
the rule of law, the legislature of the unified Germany may choose to award additional
reparations for acts of the predecessor state that contradict the value order of the Basic
Peters, supra note 135, at 2.
357
Heslop & Roberto, supra note 21, at 271 (arguing that where major foreign policy issues are concerned,
judicial deference to political determinations of the executive is appropriate).
BVerfG, supra note 287, at 1600; see supra Part 2..
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Law. 359 The Court views the decision to restore or fully compensate property taken after 1 949
as such an additional grant of reparation which the legislature was not bound to make. Since
no legal obligation dictated this decision, the legislature is free to limit additional grants to
only one part of expropriation victims. However, in doing so it must adhere to the equality
principle under the Basic Law. 360 If those expropriated after 1949 receive restitution in kind
or full financial compensation, it would violate Article 3(1) to deny any kind of
compensation to those expropriated before that date. 361
The Court sets guidelines for the future law. It orders the legislature to apply the
principles for reparations of fortunes of war. Parliament must therefore take into account the
overall burden of the state to provide for compensation, which encompasses loss of property
as well as loss of life, health, liberty, and career chances. 362 It must also consider the funds
needed to stimulate the run-down East German economy and to improve the infrastructure.
Regarding the "desolate economic conditions" in East Germany, the Court holds that a




On September 27, 1 994 the German parliament enacted the Law for Compensation
and Equalization of Burdens (Compensation Law).
364
This law regulates the amount of












Gesetz iiber die Entschadigung nach dem Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermogensfragen und iiber
staatliche Ausgleichsleistungen fuer Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher oder besatzungshoheitlicher
Grundlage [Law Concerning the Compensation According to the Property Law and Concerning the
Equalization of Burdens for Occupational Expropriations], v. 27.9.1994 (BGB1. 1 S.2624) [hereinafter
Compensation Law].
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the Property Law365 precludes restitution in kind, or where the former owner has chosen
financial compensation over restitution. 366 In implementation of the guidelines set by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Law further determines what the victims of Soviet
occupational expropriations shall receive as an "equalization of burdens".
367
Victims of Nazi
persecution are compensated according to separate regulations under Article 3 of the law.
368
Compensation for post- 1949 expropriations is based on the value the respective
property had at the time of the taking. For example, for agricultural or forest lands the
amount of compensation equals three times the value of the land at the time of taking; for
land which serves housing purposes to more than 50%, the amount of compensation equals
6.4 times that value.
369 For industrial enterprises, compensation amounts to 1.5 times the
value of the enterprise at the time of expropriation.
370 The resulting amount is subject to
abatements: Any amount exceeding DM 10,000 (German marks) is cut by 30%, any amount
exceeding DM 20,000 is cut by 40%, etc. Any amount exceeding 3 million DM is cut by
95%. 371
The benefits victims of Soviet occupation expropriations receive as equalization of
burdens are based on the rules for post- 1949 expropriations.
372 However, former owners of
property that became subject to the land reform are severely restricted in the re-acquisition
of their property. First, farmers who acquired property in the course of the land reform lost
that property through collectivization but later re-established an agricultural business
{landwirtschaftlicher Betrieb) have priority over former owners in the re-acquisition of that
property. The same is true for farmers that had newly established a farming enterprise before
365
Property Law, supra note 139.
366
















Secondly, former owners are limited in the amount of agricultural
land they may re-acquire. It may not exceed 50% of the value of the benefits received. 374 The
same rules apply for former owners who were expropriated after 1949, but precluded from
restitution under the Property Law.
b. Applicability ofInternational Standards
Prior to answering the question whether the compensation standards under the
Compensation Law are comply with international legal standards, it is necessary to examine
the applicability of such international standards. It must be emphasized that the issue of
expropriation in international law has focused almost exclusively on the property of non-
nationals.
375
"International Law has not traditionally required a state to compensate its
nationals for takings of property, since these are considered to be strictly within a state's
domestic jurisdiction."
376 Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms377 seems to extend
international standards to nationals, the European Court of Human Rights has taken a
different view. In Lithgow v. UnitedKingdom,™ the Court construed the provision narrowly,
i.e. as applying only to non-nationals.
379
The victims of expropriations in Germany were mostly German nationals, with the
exception of German emigrants who lost their property under Nazism and gained citizenship
of a foreign country after World War II. It may thus seem inappropriate to apply international
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forces, given the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that the Soviet occupational
expropriations were the work of another sovereign power.380
c. Content and Effect ofInternational Compensation Standards
aa. "Reasonable Relation" Test
In Lithgow v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights noted that
expropriation was admissible only under "exceptional circumstances," and that Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention prohibited "the taking of property without payment of an
amount reasonably related to its value". 381 This test leaves governments with a wide margin
of discretion regarding compensation, since the Court fails to specify its parameters and,
what is more, contends that any government is in a better position than an international judge
to appreciate the needs of a society.
382
In light of this rather vague standard, victims of the
Soviet occupation expropriations cannot cite Lithgow as an authority upon which they might
base claims for restitution or even for a fair market rate of compensation. This is especially
true, since the European Convention on Human Rights was not in effect at the time of these
expropriations.
bb. Just Compensation
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopts the
view that the standard of compensation for expropriations is a matter of international law.
It states in section 712:
For compensation to be just under this Subsection, it must, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the
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reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and in a form
economically usable by the foreign national. 383
The precise meaning of "just compensation" has been subject to continuous dispute.
Secretary of State Hull's exchanges with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations in 1938
are a good example of the United States' assertion that, under international law,
compensation for expropriated property must be "adequate, prompt and effective."384
Although the "Hull formula" has been incorporated in many bilateral investment treaties, it
was rejected by socialist states and by many developing countries. Instead, developing
countries proposed that the issue of compensation should be determined under the domestic
law of the expropriating state rather than under international law. 385
However, in recent years, there has been a significant shift in the attitude of
developing countries as they have come to realize the importance of foreign investment in
their moves toward privatization and freer economies.386 To ensure the legal security of vital
foreign investment, bilateral investment treaties between developing and developed nations
have proliferated which require "prompt, adequate and effective compensation."
387
In the
period from 1971 to 1991, most arbitral tribunals considering expropriations of foreign
property affirmed that the expropriating state must pay the foreign national the full market
price value of the property, although arbitrators did not explicitly invoke the "Hull
formula."
388
This implies that, in effect, the just compensation standard represents customary
international law. The Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment published
by the World Bank Group in 1992, further support international recognition of the just
compensation standard.
389
Part IV of the document provides that "[a] State may not
^Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §712(1986) reprinted in
Louis Henkin et al., International Law 727 (3 rd ed. 1993) [hereinafter Restatement].
384











Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Direct Foreign Investment,
Sept. 25, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1366 (1992).
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expropriate or otherwise take in whole or in part a foreign private investment in its territory,
. . . except where this is done . . . against the payment of appropriate compensation." The
term "appropriate is defined as "adequate, effective and prompt."
Apart from the dispute revolving around the contents of the "just compensation"
standard, Restatement section 712 is of further relevance for the Soviet occupation
expropriations in that it provides for deviation from this standard in "exceptional
circumstances". One such instance of exceptional circumstances concerns national programs
of agricultural land reform, although this has never been confirmed by an international
tribunal.
390 However, according to section 712, an "exceptional circumstances" deviation is
not admissible, if the expropriation is discriminatory.
391 As this author has argued, the land
reform conducted by the Soviet force aimed at the physical and economic destruction of the
class of large landowners and was therefore clearly discriminatory. 392 The discriminatory
character of the land reform has been contested with the argument that its goal was to break
up all large concentrations of property in the hands of a single owner.
393 However, the fact
that the land reform served to implement Communist economic theory and applied to all
large landowners cannot defeat the inhuman and degrading circumstances under which it was
put into effect. That many victims were not only expropriated, but arrested or murdered,
supports the view regarding the land reform as discriminating against an entire social class.
Due to its discriminatory character, the land reform thus does not qualify as
"exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of section 712 which would justify a
deviation from the just compensation standard. The minimal amount of compensation
provided for under the Compensation Law394 does not satisfy the standard of just
compensation. Moreover, the Compensation Law appears to violate the international legal
ion
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demand for prompt payment. Proponents ofjust compensation claim that, if compensation
is not paid at the time of taking, interest must be paid from the time of taking.395 Article 1
section 1 of the Compensation Law which is valid for all expropriations, delays payment of
compensation and payment of interest until the year of 2004. Unless the budget of the united
Germany prevents earlier payments by any means, a question this thesis does not purport to
answer, the Compensation Law does not provide for prompt, i.e. just compensation.
Supposing that the just compensation standard is applicable for victims of the Soviet
occupation expropriations which were measures of a sovereign power, the Compensation
Law violates international law because it does not provide for just compensation.
B. Czech Republic
Of all provisions regulating restitution of property expropriated under communism
in Czechoslovakia, Article 3 of the Second Restitution Act
396
of February 21, 1991 has been
the most controversial. Other than the corresponding rule in the First Restitution Act, Article
3(1) precludes non-citizens and non-residents from raising a claim under the Second
Restitution Act. Moreover, although it was theoretically possible for a foreign national of
Czech origin to return permanently to Czechoslovakia in order to state a viable restitution
claim, the administrative orders accompanying the Second Restitution Act were so
cumbersome as to effectively preclude foreign nationals from doing so.
397
Primarily, this was
due to the limited time frame under the Act, which demanded that claims be stated between
April 1, 1991 and October 1, 1991.
398
First, a claimant was required to present numerous
documents to apply for residency, e.g. detailed statements about his financial assets,
education, and skills, a detailed family tree and a notarized letter from a Czech person who
395
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agreed to resume responsibility for the applicant' s housing and medical care upon his return
to Czechoslovakia.
399
After the residency application had been approved, a process which
could take about three months, the claimant had to certify possession of good title to the
property.
400
This generally required sufficient funds to hire a local lawyer to search the
respective land records. In practice, a person who did not have access to such funds or had
no Czech relations to vouch for him or her, was therefore precluded from stating a viable
claim.
401
As a result, Article 3(1) of the Second Restitution Act has been attacked on the
grounds that it fails to advance the purpose of the restitution program as defined by
Czechoslovak officials, i.e. to correct the wrongs committed by the Communists, and that
it violates international human rights law and the Czechoslovak Bill of Rights.402
1 . Possible Violation ofInternational Human Rights Law by the Second Restitution Act
Article 3(1) provides natural persons who are Czechoslovak citizens and permanent
residents the right to claim restitution of their property, while denying such a right to non-
nationals and non-residents. In light of this discrimination. Dr. Vratislav Pechota has
suggested that the provision may violate the principle of equality and non-discrimination
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations403 and in the Universal Declaration ofHuman
Rights.
404405
This may be true, particularly because the Second Restitution Act explicitly
refers to these two documents in Article 1
:
399




A/ The Czechoslovak Bill of Rights was equivalent to The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
of Jan. 9, 1991, which was modeled on the European Convention on Human Rights, see supra note 378. In
late 1992, the drafters of the new Czech Constitution incorporated the Charter into Article 3 of that




Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948), reprinted in
Henkin et al., Basic Documents Supplement to International Law (3 rd ed. 1993) [hereinafter
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The Law concerns the redressing of the results of certain property and
other injustices arising from legal actions and rulings in both the civil and
labor legal spheres. ... in conflict with the bases of a democratic society
respecting the rights of citizens as expressed in the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and applicable
international agreements on civic, political, economic social and cultural
rights.
a. Charter ofthe United Nations
Article 55 ofthis document which entered into force on October 24, 1945, lists as one
of the goals which the United Nations shall promote the "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion/* Article 56 states that "all members pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55."
Czechoslovakia has been a signatory to the U.N. Charter since 1945. This would
seem to imply that it is legally bound, i.e. its successor states are bound to avoid acts of
discrimination.
406 However, there continues to be a debate among states and scholars of
international law as to whether the provisions of the Charter have created binding legal
obligations.
407 Although the political and judicial organs of the United Nations have
interpreted Articles 55 and 56 to be binding, the provisions are of a very general nature,
408
and have only been more closely defined by later documents, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two International Covenants of 1966.409 It is
thus "doubtful, whether states can be called to account for every alleged infringement of the
According to the international law of state succession, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic have
entered into the legal responsibilities of the former Slovakia.
407
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rather general Charter provisions," if the infringement is not of a substantial kind.
410
Section
702 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides
some guidance in determining what renders a violation substantial:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of policy, it practices,
encourages or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary
detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. 411
Since the alleged discrimination resulting from the Second Restitution Act does not
reflect such substantiality, the Charter is not a sufficient basis to show a violation of
international law.
b. Universal Declaration on Human Rights
The Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 10, 1948. Despite the Czechoslovak abstention at that time, the country in 1975
expressly accepted the Declaration in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. Article 2 of the document states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
declaration, without discrimination of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
412
One of these rights is that to equal protection of the law, laid down in Article 7 of the
document.
413 Another right is the right to property which the Declaration refers to in Article
i n 414
410
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A11 are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.
Universal Declaration, supra note 404, art. 7.
414
(1) Everyone has the right to own property
arbitrarily deprived of his property. Universal Declaration, supra note 394, art. 17.
alone or in association with others. (2) No one shall be
69
At the time of adoption, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was not
considered to be binding, but rather to provide an "authoritative guide ... to the
interpretation of the provisions in the Charter [of the United Nations]."
415 To secure
observance of the Declaration, the General Assembly in 1966 adopted two binding
international human rights covenants.416 Some scholars argue that the U.N. Charter, taken
together with the Declaration and these more specific documents has in fact created "a
customary law of human rights."417 The existence of customary international law requires
state practice of the acts concerned in combination with the belief of states that such practice
is obligatory (opinio iuris). At this date, there is insufficient state practice to support the
proposition that the Declaration as a whole is accepted as customary international law.418
Nevertheless, section 2 of the Czechoslovak Constitutional Act Instituting the Charter (of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms)
419
states that "international agreements on human rights
and fundamental freedoms, ratified and promulgated by the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic are universally binding on its territory and supersede its own laws."420 This reflects
Czechoslovakia's strong desire to respect the rights of citizens as protected under the
Declaration,
421
a desire which is equally expressed in the language of section 1 of the Second
Restitution Act.
422
It can be further inferred from state practice that, although the Declaration
as a whole may not constitute customary international law, many individual provisions of the
Declaration today do reflect customary rules. 423
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Hurst Hannum, The Status ofthe Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights in National and International
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Section 1 refers to the Czechoslovak society as "a democratic society respecting the rights of citizens as
expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...".
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With respect to the fundamental right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, "it
would seem difficult to deny the widespread acceptance of such a right." although the
Declaration does not prohibit distinctions made for non-discriminatory purposes.424 This
raises the question whether the distinctions the Second Restitution Act makes between the
expropriation victims that are citizens and residents and those that are not are rationally
related to a right to restitution.
Conversely, a right to property is not universally recognized by states which casts
doubt on its status as a norm of customary international law. 425 Restatement (Third) section
702 states that there is "wide disagreement among states as to the scope and content of [the
right to property], which weighs against the conclusion that a human right to property
generally has become a principle of customary law."426
c. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
This document, together with its Optional Protocol and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights427 was "consciously adopted as legally binding
treaty open for ratification or accession by states, in contrast to the more political or hortatory
Declaration."
428 The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was ratified by
Czechoslovakia on December 23, 1975 and entered into force on March 23. 1976. In March
1991. the Czech and Slovak Republic ratified the Optional Protocol. Following the
dissolution of the country on January 1. 1993, the Czech Republic notified its succession to
both the Covenant and the Protocol.
It is noteworthy, that the Covenant does not contain a right to private property
corresponding to Article 17 of the Declaration. The Second Restitution Act could
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nevertheless entail a breach of the Covenant, if it was based on discriminatory grounds in
violation of Article 26 of that document, which states: "All persons are equal before the law
and are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the law."
What needs to be examined is therefore, whether the requirement of Section 3 (1) of
the Act for restitution, namely citizenship of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and
residence on its territory is discriminatory within the meaning of Article 26 of the Covenant.
Since the Covenant doubtlessly imposes a legal obligation on the state parties to comply with
its rules, a breach of those rules would constitute a violation of international law.
In Simunek et al. v. The Czech Republic,429 the Human Rights Committee in its
function as the principal monitoring body of the Covenant addresses precisely the question
here at issue. Under Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol, the Committee can
receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations
of rights under the Covenant. Simunek deals with the communications of two Czech citizens
and one American citizen of Czech origin who are residents of Canada and Switzerland,
respectively. In the case of Jaroslav Simunek, he and his wife were forced to leave
Czechoslovakia in 1987 under pressure of the Communist regime which subsequently
confiscated their property. Dagmar Hastings Tuzilova and Josef Prochazka both fled the
country in 1968. They were both sentenced in absentia to a prison term as well as forfeiture
of their property because they had "illegally emigrated" from Czechoslovakia.430 Upon
adoption ofAct 87/1991 (Second Restitution Act), all three claimants (authors) requested the
return or compensation for the loss of their property. In the cases of Tuzilova and Prochazka,
both authors had been rehabilitated by the respective district courts according to the Law No.
119/1990 on Judicial Rehabilitation, i.e. the "illegality" of their emigration had been
retroactively invalidated. All authors were denied restitution or compensation on the grounds
429
Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the
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5 1 6/1 992 of July 31, 1 995 [hereinafter Communication No. 516].
43V, paras. 2.1,2.7, 2.11-2.12.
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that they did not fulfill the requirements of eligibility under section 3 (1) of Act 87/1991. In
their communications to the Human Rights Committee, they contend that these requirements
constitute unlawful discrimination, contrary to Article 26 of the Covenant.
The Committee observes "that not all differentiation in treatment can be deemed to
be discriminatory under Article 26," provided it is "based on reasonable grounds."431 The
Committee finds that all victims of confiscations are entitled to "redress without arbitrary
distinctions", since neither victim's original entitlement to his or her property was predicated
on either citizenship or residence. Therefore, the distinction made by the Second Restitution
Act is unreasonable.
432
Furthermore, the Committee argues, it was the state party (the Czech
Republic which has taken over responsibilities of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)
that caused the authors to leave the country. It would thus be "incompatible with the
Covenant to require them permanently to return to the country [that originally forced them
to depart] as a prerequisite for the restitution of their property or for the payment of
appro jriate compensation."
433 The Committee also notes that the arguments advanced by the
state party in favor of section 3(1), namely that "restitution of confiscated property is a very
complicated and de facto unprecedented measure and therefore it cannot be expected to
rectify all damages and to satisfy all the people injured by the Communist regime,"434 do not
properly justify the distinctions made under the Act. 435
In light of these considerations made by the Human Rights Committee, it must be
concluded that section 3 (1) of the Second Restitution Act plainly disregards the right to
equal treatment and non-discrimination as protected under Article 26 of the Covenant and
Article 17 of the Declaration. It thereby violates Czechoslovakia's, i.e. the Czech Republic's











d. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (Convention)436 was drafted under the
auspices of the Council of Europe and entered into force on May 18, 1954. The Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic have both been members of the Council of Europe since
1 993 and have both signed the Convention. As opposed to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the Convention recognizes a right to property in Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions, except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
437
The first paragraph explicitly regulates the most important restriction on the right to
property: expropriation in the public interest.
438 The Commission of Human Rights
(Commission) has stressed however, that a deprivation of property, "even if it has a
legitimate aim in the public interest, is a violation of Article 1 [of the First Protocol] when
there is no reasonable proportionality between interference with the individual's rights and
the objectives of public interest."
439
Furthermore, the Commission recognizes that Article 1
encompasses the right to compensation, as far as compensation is necessary to preserve such
reasonable proportionality. This is true despite the large margin of appreciation of the States
in determining the terms and conditions of an expropriation.
440
See supra note 378.
437
Protocol (No.l) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, E.T.S. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
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P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human
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In examining whether the Second Restitution Act violates Article 1 of the First
Protocol, it must be emphasized that the wrongful nature of the confiscations conducted by
the Communist government is undisputed. Even Czechoslovak officials have stated that it
is the main purpose of the restitution laws "to attempt, as best as possible, to correct the
wrongs committed by the Communist government."441 Although the issue is not whether the
confiscations themselves violated Article 1 , the fact that they were admittedly wrongful
seems to require the Czechoslovak government to provide for compensation, in order to
comply with Article 1 . The European Court of Human Rights (Court) in Lithgow442 notes
that, although international compensation standards apply only to non-nationals,443 Article
1 of the First Protocol does also limit a state's discretion regarding compensation for
expropriated nationals:
The taking of property in the public interest without compensation is
treated as justifiable only in exceptional circumstances . . . The taking of
property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would
normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be
considered justifiable under Article 1. Article I does not. however, guarantee
a right to full compensation in all circumstances.
444
This implies that the victims of the wrongful expropriations conducted by the
Communist government have at least a right to partial compensation under Article 1.
Therefore, section 3(1) of Act 87/1991 which denies such a right to non-citizens and non-
residents violates Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.
Unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Human
Rights Convention does not grant an independent right to freedom from discrimination
comparable to Article 26 of the Covenant. Article 14 of the Convention provides that "[t]he
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
44l
Renzulli, supra note 9, at 185.
442
Lithgow, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1986).
443
In this context, expropriation victims who have gained citizenship of a foreign country are treated as
nationals, because they were Czech citizens at the time of the takings.
44V at 50-51.
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discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status." According to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, Article
14 has no independent existence from the substantive provisions of the Convention, but is
nevertheless autonomous in that it "does not necessarily presuppose a breach of those
provisions."
445 Even if section 3 (1) of the Second Restitution Act did not violate the right
to property under Article 1 of the First Protocol, Article 14 of the Convention would be
applicable, because the section 3(1) falls "within the ambit"
446
of the right to property.
The Court and the Commission in their case-law have developed an approach to
establish discrimination on the basis of three conditions: (a) the facts found must disclose a
differential treatment; (b) the distinction must have no objective and reasonable justification
regarding the aim of the measure at issue; and (c) there is no reasonable proportionality
between the means employed and the aim of the measure.447 The member states to the
Convention "enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and tD what extent
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in law."
448
In fact, the
Court has read Article 14 so narrowly as to deny "reasonableness" only in cases of evident
arbitrariness.
449
Application of these principles to section 3(1) of the Second Restitution Act leads
to the following conclusions: The different treatment of citizens/residents and non-
citizens/non-residents falls within the scope of Article 14, because the enumeration of
grounds for differential treatment in the provision is not exhaustive.
450 The distinction is
evidently arbitrary for two reasons. First, it is unrelated to the original entitlement of the
445
Abdulaziz et al. v. United Kingdom, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1985), quoted in van Dijk, supra












victims to their property
451
as well as to the confiscation of the property, since the
confiscations were not limited to the property of persons who had emigrated from
Czechoslovakia. Secondly, the reasons put forward by the Czech government in defense of
the distinction, namely that due to the complicated nature of restitution it cannot be expected
that all damages will be rectified,452 does not justify the distinction made by section 3(1) and
is plainly arbitrary. Section 3 (1) thus violates Article 14 of the European Human Rights
Convention as well as Article 1 of its First Protocol.
2. Possible Violations ofCzech Constitutional Law by the Second Restitution Act
The Czechoslovak Bill of Rights is the equivalent of The Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms of January 9, 1991 which was modeled after the European Convention
on Human Rights. It was inserted into the Czechoslovak constitutional order through the
Czechoslovak Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms. After dissolution of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the drafters of the new Czech Constitution incorporated
the Charter into Article 3 of that document.
453
Article 3 of the Bill of Basic Rights and Freedoms is nearly identical to Article 14
of the Convention. Two factors would seem to compel Czech and Slovak courts to interpret
the provision in accordance with the European Court ofHuman Rights' interpretation of the
Convention. On one hand, section 2 of the Czechoslovak Constitutional Law on Human
Rights and Freedoms states that international human rights agreements ratified by
Czechoslovakia shall be binding on its territory and shall supersede its own laws. On the
other hand, the Second Restitution Act explicitly aims at redressing property injustices in
compliance with "the rights of citizens as expressed in . . . applicable international
agreements on civic, political, economic, social and cultural rights."
454
In fact, the Czech
See supra Part I.e.
^Communication No. 516, supra note 429, para. 6.2.
453
Cepl, supra note 402, at 33.
454
Second Restitution Act, supra note 179, § 1(1).
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Constitutional Court on July 12, 1994 invalidated the permanent residency requirement of
section 3(1) on the grounds that it violated the Convention as well as the Czech Bill of
Rights.
455
The right to property is granted under Article 11(1) of the Bill of Rights which reads:
"Everybody has a right to own property. Ownership rights of all owners have the same
content and are equally protected. Inheritance is guaranteed." The Czech government, in
defending section 3 (1) of the Second Restitution Act before the Human Rights Committee,
relies upon Article 11 (2) of the Bill of Rights
456 which states that "...the law may also
determine which specific things may be possessed only by citizens or legally designated
persons having their seat in the C.S.F.R. (i.e., in the Czech Republic)." It seems however,
when read in context with the first sentence of that provision, that this language was not
intended to apply to questions of restitution.
457
Rather, Article 1 1 (2) appears to justify the
preservation of state monopolies in certain industries such as power, gas and water works,
and telecommunications. The reservation of specific things to citizens or "legally designated
persons having their seat in the CSFR" seems to intend to tie up certain sources of revenue
in the hands of nationals, in order to keep foreign influence over the economy at a bearable
level.
Section 3(1) seems to violate Article 11 (1) in that it does not "equally protect" the
ownership rights of expropriation victims. When the Second Restitution Act was challenged
in the Czech Constitutional Court, the Court used this argument to invalidate section 5 (2)
of the Act. It found the six-months deadline to file a claim under the Act (April to October
^Constitutional Court Prolongs Restitution Claims Deadline, CTK National News Wire, July 12, 1994
[hereinafter Constitutional Court].
^Communication No. 5 1 6, supra note 429, para. 6.1.
457
Article 1 1(2) in its entirety provides: The law determines which property necessary to secure the needs of
the whole society, development of national economy, and public interest may be possessed only by the
state, community, or legally designated persons; the law may also determine which specific things may be
possessed only by citizens or legally designated persons having their seat in the C.S.F.R.
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1991) to be "inappropriately short" and held it to be discriminating against Czechs from
overseas.
458
3. Possible Violations ofInternational or Czech Constitutional Law by the 1994 Amendment
to the Second Restitution Act
The Second Restitution Act only covers the redress of property injustices in the
period from February 25, 1948 until January 1, 1990.
459 The amendment passed in April of
1994 extends the scope of the Act to Jewish property which was expropriated between 1938
and 1 945 on the basis of racial persecution, but excludes property taken for national or
political reasons.
460
While the Czech government limited its scope to property taken on the basis of race
to rule out Sudeten German restitution claims,461 the "racial exclusivity"462 of the amendment
may violate non-discrimination provisions of international law. Several politicians claim that
the amendment violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights463 and the European
Convention on Human Rights464 which prohibit discrimination based on, inter alia, racial
criteria. The amendment also appears to violate the right to property under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention. As interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights
and by the Commission. Article 1 mandates compensation for a taking of property where
such compensation is necessary to establish proportionality between the burden forced upon
the individual and the goal the national government seeks to achieve through the
expropriation.
465 By limiting restitution or compensation to those who lost their property
between 1939 and 1945 on the basis of race, the amendment imposes a disproportionate
^Constitutional Court, supra note 455.
459
Second Restitution Act, supra note 179, § 1(1).
460
Victor Gomez, Parliament Approves the Return ofJewish Property, THE PRAGUE POST, May 4, 1994.
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burden on other victims who were expropriated during the same period but not on a racial
basis. In order to comply with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Czech Republic would
therefore have "to compensate all nationals whose property was expropriated without
compensation, or to compensate none at all."466
Similarly, the amendment seems to violate the non-discrimination and equal
protection ofproperty clauses. Articles 3 (1) and 11 (1), of the Czech Bill of Rights. It is hard
to predict whether the Czech Constitutional Court would uphold the amendment, if its
opponents chose to challenge its constitutionality. Bearing in mind the Court's decision to
invalidate certain requirements of the Second Restitution Act which demonstrated a certain
independence from political pressure, it has been speculated that the Court will strike down
the amendment as well.467 On the other hand, the moral and political pressure on the
government to redress Jewish sufferings is strong. If the Court finds the amendment
unconstitutional but the government nevertheless feels compelled to return Jewish property,
Czech legislators will face a dilemma. In order to avoid discrimination, the scope of the
restitution laws would have to be so broadened as to encompass all property confiscated
between 1938 and 1945. In that situation, the requirement of the Second Restitution Act that
claimants be Czech citizens would be the only obstacle to Sudeten German property claims.
On the other hand, Czech suspicions of their economically powerful German neighbor and
traditional tensions between Czechs and Germans have caused most Czechs to reject Sudeten
German claims.468 A legislative proposal to return Sudeten German property is thus unlikely
to pass the Czech Parliament.469
However, the increasing influence the international legal standard of just
compensation has gained in the recent past may eventually compel Czech legislators to
466
Hochstein, supra note 48, at 445-46.
467
Id, at 447.
Bowl, supra note 232, at 8; see generally CORNEJ, supra note 42, at 30 et seq. (tracing the Czech-German
conflict back to the Thirty Years' War).
Hochstein, supra note 48, at 4^
Czech Republic and its leaders").
47 (calling such an alternative "economic and political suicide for the
80
compensate Sudeten Germans financially for the property lost after World War II. The
principle of international responsibility for injuries to alien property seems at least to apply
to the confiscations pursuant to the Decree of Oct. 25, 1945
470 which was enacted after the




Due to the fact that Poland has not enacted a restitution law to date, an analysis can
only take into account certain features of the many draft bills submitted to the Sejm since
1991.
472 The author will focus on the latest draft introduced by the Government which is
currently pending in the Sejm, although its passage before the upcoming 1997 parliamentary
elections is unlikely. If the present Solidarity-led opposition should subside in the elections,
a future restitution bill would probably favor former owners more than is the case under the
current government draft. The author will take these possible developments into
consideration and discuss the essential proposals forwarded by the opposition as well.
1 . International Legal Aspects ofDraft Restitution Laws
The current government draft provides for compensation only for Polish citizens who
are domiciled in Poland, although Parliament continues to debate on the issue. The
opposition favors to allow claims by people who were Polish citizens at the time of
expropriation and who are residents or who intend to return to reside in Poland. 473 Both
alternatives might violate rules of international law.
474
See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
47]
See generally Schiller, supra note 44, at 424 (arguing that while Germany may have a de iure claim for
compensation of Sudeten German property, de facto it does not).
'.See supra Chapter III.
Youngblood, supra note 1 18, at 647.
See generally Aronovitz, supra note 94.
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a. International Responsibilityfor Injuries to Alien Property
In the section about the restitution regime in Germany, it has been mentioned that
principles of international law have traditionally not applied to injuries caused by a state to
its own nationals. The doctrine of international responsibility is mainly concerned with the
injury a host state causes to foreign property which is located within the host state's territory.
If such injury occurs in violation of international law, the foreigner's home state may invoke
legal means against the host state under the international responsibility doctrine. 475 However,
if the host state complies with international legal standards of compensation, the taking of
the alien property does not constitute a violation of international law.
476
This means that home states whose nationals have been expropriated by the Polish
state without compensation according to international standards may now have a viable claim
under international law to demand such compensation from Poland.477 Conversely, states
which have concluded bilateral lump-sum treaties with Poland are precluded from further
espousing the claims of their nationals, since the lump-sum payments fulfill the purpose of
compensation.
478




other states have not
formally settled questions of compensation for expropriation of their nationals with Poland.
This includes the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945 placed the German territory of East
Prussia under Polish administration. Subsequently, a Polish decree of September 13, 1945
expelled all Germans residing in East Prussia from the "regained territory", considering them
to be "traitors of the Polish people".
480 From an international legal perspective, these
'
5
Id., at 244-45. Such means can be generally described as "diplomatic protection of citizens abroad." Id.





The United States and Poland signed a lump-sum agreement in 1960. Treaty Between the Government of
the United States and the Government of the Polish People's Republic Regarding Claims of Nationals of the
United States, July 16, 1960, 1 1 U.S.T. 1953.
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Germans were aliens with respect to the Polish state. Their property was expropriated by the
Polish authorities in several decrees, in part preceding their expulsion. Therefore, the
international rules regarding the responsibility of states for injuries to alien property apply.
Although part of the Polish measures expropriating German property provided for
compensation of some sort, the victims never actually received any payments that would
have complied with the minimal standard of compensation required by international law.
481
Consequently, Germany appears to have a viable claim against Poland to provide for
compensation for the property losses suffered by German nationals.
Some scholars question the validity of such a claim, given that the takings occurred
several decades ago. They suggest that Poland invoke the doctrine of acquisitive prescription,
based on the passage of time and the fact that Germany failed to press compensation claims
in the past.
482 However, this approach disregards the fact that as long as Poland stood under
Communist rule, Germany could not be reasonably expected to pursue its claims. Even if
Polan .1 and Germany had signed a lump-sum agreement, which they have not, such a lump-
sum would not have equaled the full value of the property at the time of expropriation. It is
thus questionable, whether a period of prescription of any compensation claim would not
have to begin "at the date when, on the basis of above 'revolutionary' events [i.e. the
democratization of Poland], it became obvious that claims should be pressed."483
A German claim to compensation would further be precluded, if Germany had
directly or indirectly recognized the expropriation measures.
484
It is undisputed that the
Warsaw Treaty, concluded between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on
November 18, 1970485 does not touch upon questions of property arising from the expulsion
JO
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and expropriation of Germans from East Prussia.486 The Convention on the Settlement of
Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation487 prohibits German citizens to assert
claims arising out of actions taken by countries at war with Germany in the period from
September 1, 1939 until June 5, 1945, if such actions were taken because of the state of war.
Although the relevant provision prevents the adjudication of compensation claims regarding
Polish takings of German property during the war because it renders these claims
inadmissible, it does not do away with the claims per se. Moreover, the provision does not
apply to acts of expropriation that occurred after the end of World War II on June 6, 1945.488
A final objection that is made to the validity of German compensation claims
regarding the expropriation of German nationals by Polish authorities is that such claims
might be barred by a time limitation. Ermacora refutes this argument in regarding the
expropriations as a measure of systematic racial discrimination against the Germans which
bear characteristics of genocide. According to international legal rules, crimes against
humankind, such as genocide, are not subject to time limitations.
489
A Polish restitution law that does not provide for compensation to German
expropriation victims, which applies to both the government and the opposition proposals,
arguably violates the international rules regarding responsibility of a host state for injuries
to alien property.
b. Violation ofInternational Human Rights Law
According to the draft submitted by the government, Polish citizens domiciled in
Poland will be compensated for their lost property, while Polish and former Polish nationals
486
ERMACORA, supra note 78, at 87.
487
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, Oct. 23, 1954, ch.
9, Art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 441 1, 4504. The Treaty was concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the three Western Allies.
488
ERMACORA, supra note 78, at 89. The author argues that the denial ofjudicial process resulting from
these regulations violates Art. 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. the right to a fair and
public hearing in the determination of one's civil rights. Id., at 103-04.
58V, at 70-71.
84
living abroad will receive nothing. This proposal may violate several norms of international
human rights law. At this point the author would like to refer to her discussion of the
provision in the Czechoslovak Restitution Act limiting restitution/compensation to citizens
and residents of that country. Any such discrimination between citizens/residents and those
that have emigrated and given up their citizenship violates the right to equal treatment and
non-discrimination as embodied in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,
490
in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,491 and in
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.492
Furthermore, a Polish restitution law precluding former nationals and non-residents
would violate the guarantee to a right to property laid down in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to
the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights in
Lithgow held that an expropriation of a state's national must be accompanied by reasonable
compensation, in order to comply with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Unless Polish nationals
living abroad are granted compensation according to mnimum international standards, the
law would thus violate Article 1 . The same is true with respect to compensation of former
Polish nationals, since they had Polish citizenship at the time of the taking.
Another issue of debate in the Sejm is whether compensation should be made only
to those whose property was taken in violation of the Communist decrees, as the government
suggests, or also to those who were expropriated in accordance with the decrees.493 The
Polish Privatization Ministry is of the opinion that the state is obliged only to compensate
those who were expropriated contrary to the law, while "the others are subject to the good
will of the government."
494 However, the holding in Lithgow suggests the opposite.
International law mandates the payment of reasonable compensation to nationals as well as
See supra note 378.
See supra note 383.
492
See supra note 353. Poland signed the Convention on January 19, 1993.
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Sean Bobbin, For Sale: By Owner?, Warsaw BUSINESS JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 1995, at 16; Halaba, Re-
Writing History, supra note 1 1 , at 1
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to foreigners, notwithstanding the fact that the expropriation might have complied with the
domestic law in force at the time.
While the opposition generally favors restitution in kind, the government's draft only
provides for compensation in government bonds which would not equal the total value of the
lost property.
49i
In kind restitution, so the government argues, "would bankrupt the state and
interfere with the urgent task of selling off thousands of moribund factories to new owners
— Polish and foreign— who know how to make a profit."496 The government also claims
that restitution could cause social tensions.
497
Conversely, former owners believe that the
possibility of buying shares or property for the bonds exists only in theory and that, in fact,
the bonds will be of minimal value.498 On this issue, international law does not support
former owners' demands. In general international law. restitution in kind "is not a remedy
usually awarded for state takings of private property. . . . because of the practical difficulties
posed by this remedy."
499
This is confirmed by the decision of the Permanent International
Court of Justice in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzow which determined that the
usual remedy for property takings should be compensation. 500 It is further doubtful whether
former owners are entitled under international law to compensation of the full value of the
lost property. The Lithgow Court explicitly held that Article 1 of Protocol No.l of the
Convention does not guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances.
501
Compensation must merely balance out the disproportionate burden imposed upon the
individual by the expropriation measure.
495
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Property, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Feb. 16, 1995, at 13 [hereinafter Sejm Discusses].
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2. Constitutional Legal Aspects
Poland is the only country in the former Soviet Bloc where no constitutional catalog
of individual freedoms has been adopted since the 1989 revolution. 502 The so-called Little
Constitution which came into effect on December 1, 1992 clarifies the division of power
between the legislative and the executive, but does not mention individual rights and judicial
review.
503
Instead, the chapter on the "rights and obligations of citizens" of the Stalinist
Constitution of 1 952 is still in force with some amendments regarding the relation between
the individual and the public authorities.
504
These provisions do not provide citizens with any
instruments of protection against infringement of their rights by the state, however. 505
Although it is possible that a future constitution will contain a right to equal treatment
before the law
506
and a right to private property, Polish courts will not necessarily give such
rights the same meaning that international tribunals give them. The Polish Constitutional
Tribunal which was established in 1985 has declared itself "unprepared" to decide on the
conformity of Polish domestic law with international law, and there exists "no authority
which establishes in the Polish courts the viability of claims based on international human
rights law."
5 7
It is thus difficult to predict, how Polish courts will interpret the scope of
rights granted in a future constitution, and if the draft proposals for a Polish restitution law
would violate those rights.
Nevertheless, the fact that the government draft discriminates against Polish or
former Polish citizens living abroad is questionable even under the current Constitution as
en-)
"According to recent newspaper reports, several issues are still under debate in the Constitutional
Committee of the National Assembly. Controversy Over Constitution, POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, Dec. 16,
1996.
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amended in 1989. 508 Article 1 of the 1952 Constitution was amended to state that Poland "is
a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice."509 An
argument can be made that the Polish state does not submit to the rule of law, if it refuses to
compensate at least those property losses of non-residents that Polish authorities themselves
recognize to have occurred in "abuse of the law,"510 i.e. takings of property that violated the
Communist laws.
Furthermore, the government draft may violate the protection of ownership under the
amended 1952 Constitution. Article 7 reads: "The Republic of Poland shall protect
ownership and the right of succession and shall guarantee comprehensive protection of
personal property. Expropriation may be allowed exclusively for public purposes and against
just compensation." Comprehensive protection of property as generally practiced by
democratic states does not distinguish between the property of residents and that of non-
residents.
5 " Although non-citizens could not take recourse to Polish constitutional rights due
to k'ck of standing, non-residents could do so in order to attack a future restitution law
discriminating against them.
Former owners might even invoke Article 7 to argue that those who were
expropriated in accordance with the Communist laws should not be precluded from
compensation, as the government draft suggests. If the government seeks to uphold those
expropriations on the grounds that they were legal (under communism), it is bound by the
new Article 7 to provide for "just compensation." Whether the protection of ownership
mandates restitution in kind rather than financial compensation, a view shared by certain
groups in the opposition, depends on how the courts interpret the term "public purposes." All
expropriations that did not serve a public purpose, which would seem to include those illegal
508
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even under Communist law, would be invalid and the property would have to be restored to
its former owners.
If one compares the government's draft with the proposals made by the opposition,
the latter are more in line with principles of international law and with the amended Polish
Constitution, because they do not limit compensation to those expropriated contrary to
Communist law and because they provide for ampler possibilities to restore the actual
property to the former owners.
Chapter V
Political Factors Governing Restitution Regimes and Consequences of
Implementation
A. Political Background
A legal analysis of the Eastern European restitution regimes cannot wholly disregard
political factors which have essentially governed the outcome of the process creating those
regimes. In looking at how Germany, the Czech Republic, and Poland have dealt with the
restitution issue, the enormous differences between the resulting legal systems strike the eye.
Although these differences are related, to a certain extent, to the history of expropriation
measures taken in each country, they have their origin in political forces prompting decision-
makers to choose a particular policy. As one author has suggested, "the likelihood of passing
strong restitution measures varies inversely with the strength of the left and the technocrats
in the political arena."
512
Nationalist right forces stress moral and historical justice arguments
and demand restitution in kind combined with substitution or full compensation for altered
or lost items. This strategy generally includes the suspension of privatization until restitution
claims are settled.
513
Left and technocrat forces, on the other hand, oppose restitution, the
technocrats arguing that it blocks investment and slows down privatization, the left
criticizing the "resurrection of a questionable distributive scheme.
'
,514 The differences
between the political forces at work in each country explain why Germany and the Czech
Republic have opted for strong restitution laws favoring former owners while Poland has still
' l2






not passed any restitution legislation and presently tends to condemn in-kind restitution and
to limit compensation to a minimal amount within the constraints of the national budget.
In the former Czechoslovakia, a conservative majority successfully pushed for all-out
restitution, because the political left lacked credibility "due to its real or popularly perceived
association with the deposed Communist Party."515 Because Soviet suppression of
Czechoslovak reform initiatives had been particularly rigid since the upheavals during the
Prague Spring in 1968,
516
the defeat of the Communists in the fall of 1989 unleashed a
counter-reaction. Czechoslovaks turned in hatred against anyone affiliated with the former
ruling party.
517 The sophistication with which the former government had suppressed any
dissent, in obedience to the Soviets, also spurred the popular demand for lustration, i.e. the
purging of all former Communists from positions of state officials. 518 The emotional force
behind this anti-Communist movement prevented any new leftist party from effectively
promoting their distributive justice arguments against restitution.
Although the Slovak leader Vladimir Meciar supported an anti-restitution campaign
in the Czechoslovak Parliament before the country broke apart, Slovak interests were
minority interests at the time. Slovakia which had been mainly agricultural prior to the
Communist era had never opposed the nationalization of its maldistributed wealth and was
adamant to keep the subsidies and eastern markets for its industry developed under
Communism. 519
Technocrat arguments against restitution were only of marginal effect in
Czechoslovakia, due to its relatively stable economic condition before implementation of the
restitution program. Compared to the situation in, for instance, Poland or Hungary, foreign
Under Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovak Communists developed a model of "Socialism with a human
face" which allowed for progressive reforms in the areas of politics and the economy. The Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia ended the Prague Spring in August of 1968.
Gelpem, supra note 121, at 324.
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debt and inflation were low which led Czechoslovak leaders to believe that the country could
afford the temporary slow-down of privatization that would be caused by the settlement of
restitution claims.
520
Another factor weighing heavily in favor of restitution was the strong "moral
awareness"
521 among Czechoslovaks concerning the need to return property to its former
owners. Such concepts of moral purification were closely related to the anti-Communist
sentiments and the desire to do away with everything that reminded of the former
government. Moreover, the Czechoslovak privatization campaign was "a late-starter"
522
in
comparison to Poland where economic reforms had emerged during the 1 980s under the
Communist government and where privatization began in 1990. Therefore. Czechoslovaks
missed the economic "adjustment shocks" that the Poles experienced as a result of
privatization in Poland and that have kept Polish politicians from passing strong restitution
legislation.
523
While former Communists had no influence on Czechoslovak restitution policies, the
situation in Poland was quite different. On one hand, the Solidarity movement which toppled
the Communist government in 1989, advanced distributive justice arguments against
restitution, taking the traditionally leftist position of a trade union.
524 On the other hand, the
Communists themselves played an active role in Poland's transition to democracy,
strengthening the opposition to restitution even more.
525
In fact, the influence of the former
Communists re-increased after the Solidarity government implemented its "shock therapy"
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Accordingly, Solidarity was defeated by a coalition of former Communists in the 1993
parliamentary elections. This change in power has considerably slackened the pace of
privatization and the motivation to create a restitution law.
The devastating results of one decade of economic stagnation in combination with
the "adjustment shocks" the economy showed, also lend greater credibility to technocrat
arguments than was the case in Czechoslovakia: In 1990 and 1991, Poland's national income
fell by 1 3 percent, investment growth dropped by 1 percent, inflation reached an annual rate
of 585 percent, and unemployment rose to more than 6 percent.
527
In light of these
circumstances and in view of the economic problems arising in the Czech and Slovak
Republics through implementation of their restitution programs, Poland has been hesitant to
tackle the restitution issue.
528 Another reason why Poland has not yet passed a restitution law
is that often the valuation of claims is nearly impossible, given the absence of a market, the
loss of records pertaining to property ownership and the severe destruction of buildings and
infrastructure.
529
The current draft law submitted by the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance, consisting of
former Communists) and the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) does not provide for restitution in
kind, but limits restitution to compensation in government bonds, in order to stay within the
constraints of the budget. By June of 1993. the aggregate restitution claims totaled 100.000
and were valued at $ 14 billion, an amount that exceeded Poland's entire annual budget by
far.
531 To implement a law providing for all-out restitution or full financial compensation,
"would render the present economy impotent long before all the claims could be satisfied."531
52V
528When asked about the consequences Poland might draw from restitution in Czechoslovakia, Poland's
former Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz said: "It's time to learn from someone else's mistakes, not our
own." Gelpern, supra note 121, at 332.
529
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Id., at 657. The proposal to abandon restitution and to limit compensation to vouchers made in 1994,
brought the total price of restitution below 100,000 billion zlotys ($4,4 billion). Id.
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All in all, calls for "historical justice" and utilitarian arguments in favor of restitution
in kind, such as the improvement of business efficiency through restitution, the creation of
a new propertied middle-class, and fostering a sense of entrepreneurship. "have been offset
by concerns for fiscal responsibility and a return to a prewar social order."
532
The German restitution program is arguably the most extensive of all Eastern
European countries. 533 Similar to the Czechoslovak regime, the German laws provide for
restitution in kind and for full financial compensation if return is impractical, because the
property has been dedicated to public use or integrated into an enterprise etc. However, the
German regime favors former owners even more than the Czechoslovak laws, in that it is not
limited to citizens and residents and applies to natural as well as legal persons. Under the
German Property Law, restitution also applies to property takings that occurred before the
Communist government seized power. Citizens and organizations expropriated between
1933 and 1945 are granted restitution of their property, if they lost it during that period due
to persecution on the basis of l ace, political opinion, religion, or ideology (Weltanschauung).
Drafters of the German restitution regime were faced with the singular task to adapt
the East German system of property and to integrate it into the legal and political system of
the West German democracy. In doing so, they had to respect the interests of the former east
German citizens as well as the contradictory claims of former owners most ofwhom had fled
to the West after the government took their land. 534 While East Germans were afraid to lose
the land they currently occupied and to see the prewar social order of large landholders
("Junker") reestablished, former owners uttered violent calls for historical justice and
exerted considerable moral pressure on the policy-makers.
In founding the restitution program upon the principle of restitution over
compensation, the government gave priority to Western lobbyists, albeit entering into several
532
Id., at 676. The fact that most former landowners lobbying for restitution were former aristocrats
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compromises. Restitution is precluded, if the property at issue has been used to house East
German citizens and those citizens have acquired ownership rights. Furthermore, the
decisions whether property should be returned are made by local, i.e. East German
authorities on a case-by-case basis, in the interest ofpublic stability, for to give East Germans
some control over the future of "their land" was thought to inspire greater public satisfaction
with the restitution program.
535
As I have demonstrated, the most controversial compromise involved the preclusion
of victims of the 1945-1949 expropriations from restitution. The political nature of this
decision is obvious. First, the resolution of competing property claims in the fastest possible
manner was necessary to ensure swift social and economic integration of East Germany,
which is a precondition to political stability. 536 To open up the eight million acres of land
taken through the land reform to restitution claims of 14.000 former owners would have
delayed privatization for a considerable number of years. 537 Moreover, the German
government needed money to bear the enormous cost of unification which was estimated in
1990 at $170,000 million and turned out to be at least twice as high.
538 As early as 1990, the
government openly said that it intended to pay for reunification through privatization of the
East German state's holdings. 539
Adding to the overwhelming political pressure for prompt reunification, the
"unquestioning faith of the Bonn politicians in the healing powers of the market"540
weakened the opposition to extensive restitution legislation. "They were completely
transported by romantic notions of West Germany in 1948, of currency reform, the d-mark
and Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). The comparison could hardly have been less
535
Id, at 543-44.
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says Heiner Flassbeck. chief economist at the DIW economics institute in
Berlin. When reality took over, the inability of the East German industry to compete on the
global market was revealed; "the capital stock was worthless; the infrastructure a
nightmare."
542
But once the political decision to seize the historical moment of unification
had been made, the economy had to live with the consequences. 543 Despite the subsequent
legislative efforts to prevent property disputes from inhibiting investment, the investment-
based exceptions to restitution that were created through amendments to the Property and
Investment Laws "proved to be too little, too late."544
Notwithstanding the fact that the political decisions in drawing up the German
restitution program are questionable from an economic point of view, they reflect the
stronger moral and political concerns behind the laws that outweighed economic factors.
Although the regulations might have looked slightly different, if politicians had been more
aware of economic realities, the principle of restitution over compensation would certainly
be upheld, were the issue to be once more decided.
B. Consequences of Implementation
Estimates as to the cost of restitution in the Czech Republic still varied in 1993,
although the deadlines for filing claims under the three restitution laws had all passed in
1992.
545
According to most sources, the value of property eligible for restitution equaled $10
billion, $ 750 million of which would account for cash compensation.
546 A report dating to
August of 1993 states that 100,000 units valued at $4,07 billion have been returned to former
owners.
547
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Czech law which requires claimants to negotiate directly with the party in possession of the
property.
548
Notwithstanding the widespread opinion among European company chairmen that
the Czech Republic will be the Eastern European country with the healthiest economy in 20
years, the facts show that the restitution program, due to the lengthy process of claim
evaluation, has taken personnel and resources away from the privatization process. 549 This
suggests that restitution has not helped to stabilize the Czech property regime but, on the
contrary, has had a destabilizing effect combined with huge costs. Believing restitution to be
an effective form of privatization seems to have been proven an illusion.
In Poland, the majority of politicians has recognized the dilemma between fiscal
realities and a sense of historical justice, and has grown more and more hesitant to enact any
restitution legislation. Negative impacts ofthe Czechoslovak program have caused the Polish
government to scale the cost of a possible future restitution program in Poland down to an
amount within constraint of the annual budget, arguing "the best the government could do
was apologize and offer minimal financial compensation."550 Nevertheless, local
governments and ministries are pressing parliament to pass a restitution law. Absent
regulations on the issue, Polish citizens have raised 1 00,000 restitution claims targeted at
these institutions under Poland's Code of Administrative Procedure, a costly process which
could be handled more efficiently and at a lower cost through restitution legislation. 551 It
remains to be seen, whether the Sejm will eventually submit to these pressures and if so,
what the outcome of the current debate will be.
What I have said about the impact of restitution in the Czech Republic holds equally
true for Germany. The time-consuming processing of claims on a case-by-case basis has
prevented or at least delayed privatization and asset transfers and has been a major obstacle
Gelpem, supra note 121, at 359-60.
Grewe, supra note 547.
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in reconstructing the East German economy, 552 rather than supporting it by "renewing the
original relations of former owners to their land," improving business efficiency, or
"fostering a sense of entrepreneurship". Seven years after reunification, Germany is in the
midst of recession in east and west. The industrial base in East Germany has collapsed, GDP
growth has stumbled (from 5.8% in 1992, 7.8% in 1993, to estimates below4% in 1996), and
official unemployment in 1996 was close to 20% (12% for the whole country). 553 Although
most economists blame the fatal situation on the 1 :2 exchange rate chosen for the currency
union
554
and on the generous wage agreements with the labor unions which have raised wage
levels in East far above actual productivity and have disabled German labor to compete in
the global marketplace,
555
the restitution program has certainly not helped to prevent
recession. In 1993, German officials estimated that it would take another 15 years to dispose
of all outstanding property claims.
556 The painstaking process has scared away investment.
Japanese investors, a potentially vast source of capital, mentioned unsolved ownership rights
as a main reason for their generally avoiding East Germany. 557
Another feature of the German restitution regime disadvantageous to economic
development is the rejection of voucher privatization in order to avoid West German
demands for vouchers. Other East European countries, like the Czech Republic, have used
the voucher method to increase access to venture capital, a precondition for the growth of
medium-size firms. 558 It is those Mittelstand firms rather than multinationals that have the
"Karin Bredemeyer, East Germany: Progress and Problems, Deutsche Bank Research Bulletin, Oct. 17,
1994.
David Shirreff, Germany: East Germany, The Achilles Heel ofEurope, Reuter Textline Euromoney, Apr.
30, 1996.
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essential locally stabilizing effect which was "the backbone of the post-war economic
miracle."
559
With hindsight, restitution policies have therefore held up investment and
privatization and have failed to advance the transformation of the former Communist states




Products of political compromise and economic policy, restitution regimes have
several legal defects. The analysis shows that some of the major decisions made by the
drafters of restitution legislation have resulted in provisions that violate basic principles of
international law and often contradict the respective country's constitutional law.
The German rule that precludes victims of expropriations conducted by the Soviet
Occupational forces in the period from 1945-1949 from restitution has been declared
constitutional by the Bundesverfassimgsgericht. Nevertheless, a close look at the Court's
decision reveals its weaknesses and renders it highly questionable. The Court failed to give
sufficient weight to international law as it governs a state's public policy and ignored the
international law of military occupation. Furthermore, it held the preclusion to be
constitutional although it clearly violates the equality principle under the German Basic Law.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht arrived at this decision in relying upon facts which have
turned out to be false.
As opposed to the German restitution program, the main Czech Restitution Act limits
restitution or compensation to citizens and residents of the country, a regulation that has been
adopted by the successor republics as has most of the restitution regime. Although the Czech
Constitutional Court invalidated the provision requiring restitution claimants to be Czech
residents, the law continues to discriminate against former citizens of Czechoslovakia who
emigrated under Communist pressure and were deprived of their property on the basis of
their "illegal emigration." To deny restitution to such persons violates the international
human rights to property and to equal treatment before the law as embodied in several human
99
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rights documents ratified by the Czech Republic, including the European Convention on
Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Similarly, the
exclusion of foreign citizens of Czech origin seems to violate the rights to property and equal
treatment under the Czech Bill of Rights (the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms)
which was modeled after the European Convention on Human Rights.
Poland has as yet failed to pass either a restitution law or a Bill of Rights. An analysis
under constitutional aspects is thus necessarily limited. Under international human rights law,
the current government draft encounters the same problems as the Czech legislation, in that
it provides for compensation only to citizens and residents of Poland. A major defect of all
draft bills submitted to the Sejm since 1990 lies in their disregard for the international law
of expropriation. When a state takes away the property of an alien residing on its territory,
it is obliged under international law to provide for just compensation. Nevertheless, none of
the Polish draft laws have addressed Poland's international legal obligation to pay
compensation for German property located in former German territory which was placed
under Polish administration after the Second World War. After the expulsion of its German
owners from Poland, Polish authorities confiscated such property without compensation.
In spite ofthe many legal faults inherent to the three restitution regimes subject to this
analysis, it is unlikely that these defects will be mended either by the legislature or through
constitutional jurisdiction. Restitution is a perfect example of a situation in which policy-
makers neglect legal concerns for the sake of economic and social welfare and political
stability. In Germany, the government decided to refuse restitution to victims of the land
reform for two reasons. On one hand, to restore property to large landholders and aristocrats
would have spurred social discontent among East Germans who feared re-establishment of
the pre-war social order. On the other hand, the cost of reunification was so enormous that
the government decided to compensate for this cost through privatization of a large part of
the East German state's holdings.
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Czech legislators facing a similar economic dilemma, decided to confine restitution
to citizens and residents and to sell the property of former Czechoslovak citizens to investors,
unless the former owners decided to permanently return to the Czech Republic.
The Polish failure to pass any restitution legislation in the seven years since the
collapse of the Communist government, is largely based on the strong influence the former
Communists have nevertheless had in the transition to democracy, and on the traditionally
leftist position of the trade unions. Traditional distributive justice arguments promoted by
these groups have nourished the opposition to an extensive restitution program. Moreover,
the "adjustment shocks" following the 1990 economic reforms in Poland have opened Polish
ears to technocrat arguments against restitution which have outweighed calls for historical
justice. As in the Czech Republic, non-citizens (and non-residents) are precluded from
restitution according to the latest Polish draft law, in order to relieve the strained budget of
a major burden.
In the face of such pressing economic and political concerns, constitutional
jurisprudence tends to defer to the more representative organs of government. Although
constitutional analysis must not succumb to political influences, "[jjudicial deference to
legislatively-approved political determinations of the executive branch is appropriate where
necessary to resolve major foreign policy issues" or to ensure "swift social and economic
integration."
5
° The decision of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht reflects precisely this
attitude, and one may infer from the position the Czech Constitutional Court and the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal have assumed so far, that they also support the notion of judicial
deference.
One may well argue that further discussion is futile, once the constitutional court has
approved of the decisions of legislature and executive. After all, justice est faite.
Nevertheless, cases like Simunek v. The Czech Republic give rise to the hope that
60
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international human rights and their institutions are gaining increasing influence in Eastern
Europe as much as anywhere else. This should encourage individuals to seek support from
international tribunals where national policy clashes with international human rights.
Many commentators, scholars, and politicians have advanced substantial arguments
against restitution, proving it to be ''economically inefficient and morally unjust."561
Restitution delays privatization and investment, it "aggravates the notorious fiscal problems
of post-Communist states,"562 and it threatens to offset political stability in the new state
because its selectivity endangers the social consensus.
563
Furthermore, it creates injustices
in compensating only losses of property while those who have suffered non-property losses,
such as loss of family or career, are left out.
564
Notwithstanding these powerful arguments,
all post-Communist European states have adopted restitution policies to a greater or lesser
extent, depending on the political forces at work in each country. One reason why restitution
gained parliamentary support has been its legitimizing effect on the "shaky property system"
in contradicting the perception that most of the new wealth has fallen in the hands of the
former nomenklatura.
565
Another reason is that restitution legislation has been employed "as
a vehicle for the construction of national identities in nation-states,"
566
particularly in the
Czech Republic and in Poland, where the laws generally avoid restoring property to former
owners who do not belong to the majority population, such as Jews and ethnic German and
Hungarian minorities.
567 However, the driving force behind restitution has been the more or
less realistic desire to shake off the bonds of Soviet oppression and to achieve Western
European standards as fast as possible. The sense of continuity, historical memory and
561
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national identity that restitution, in kind or in the form of financial compensation, is apt to
procure has made it a political reality in post-Communist Eastern Europe today.
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Joint Declaration of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of
the German Democratic Republic on the Regulation of Open Property Questions of
June 15, 1990
Art.l: The expropriations made based upon the foundation of occupation law or
occupation
sovereignty (1945-1949) are not to be revoked. The governments of the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic see no possibility to revise the
measures taken at that time. In light of the historical development, the Federal
Republic of Germany takes notice of this position. It is of the opinion that a final
decision on any possible government of compensation must be reserved for a
future German Parliament.
Act on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation (Act No. 87/1991) of Feb. 21, 1991 (Czech.)
Art. 3: The Entitled Person
(1) The "entitled person" is a physical person, whose possession became the
property of the state under circumstances outlined in Article six of this law,
providing that such persons are citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,
and have their place of residence in this country.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986)
§ 712. Economic Injury to Nationals of Other States
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that
(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation;
For compensation to be just under this subsection, it must, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the property
taken and be paid at the time of taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with




Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention on Human Rights) of Nov. 4, 1950
Art. 14: Prohibition of Discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex. race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth, or other status.
Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1: Right to the Peaceful Enjoyment of One's Possessions
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
